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NAKED AND COVERED IN MONTE CARLO:
A REAPPRAISAL OF OPTION TAXATION
Eric D. Chason ·
The market for equity options and related derivatives is staggering,
covering trillions of dollars worth of assets. As a result, the taxation of
these instruments is inherently important. Moreover, the importance is
made even more acute by the use of options in creating more complex
transactions and in avoiding taxes.
Consider an equity call option, which entitles, but does not obligate,
its holder to buy stock at a set price at a set time in the future. Option
theory gives us a way to break the option down into more fundamental
units. For example, an equity call option over 10,000 shares of stock
might be equivalent to buying 7500 shares of stock itself
This financially equivalent synthetic option should serve as the
model for taxing an actual option. That is not the approach of current
law. Nevertheless, a Monte-Carlo simulation I wrote shows that current
law does a good job of approximating the tax liability generated by the
synthetic option - but only when we view the option in isolation.
The results are radically different when the investor already owns
some of the stock subject to the option. If such an investor sells (rather
than buys) a call option, she has effectively sold a portion of the owned
stock at fair market value. For example, the issuer of a call option over
10,000 shares may have effectively sold 7500 shares that she already
owns. Option theory gives us a way to measure how much stock she has
effectively sold. Taxing the sale of stock implied by many option and
related contracts would reflect economic reality and curtail taxmotivated investments.

• Assistant Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe
School of Law. I thank Glenn Coven, Rich Hynes, Eric Kades, Michael Knoll, John
Lee, Alan Meese, and Lawrence Zelenak for comments on prior drafts of this paper. I
also thank Karen Gurth, Brandon Rogers, Matt Stuart, and Will Woolston for their
research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCfiON

Finding the correct tax treatment of equity options is a crucial
task for three reasons. First, the market for equity options and other
equity derivatives is enormous. In June 2006, equity options and
related contracts covered assets worth almost $6.8 trillion, or about
1
one half the U.S. gross domestic product. The sheer size of the
market warrants attention. Second, more complex financial contracts
2
are often based on options. Finding the right tax treatment of options
will thus help us find the right tax treatment of these other contracts.
3
Third, options and related contracts are often used to avoid taxes.
Thus, taxing options correctly would eliminate inefficient tax arbitrage
4
and ensure equitable treatment of taxpayers.
Let us start with a call option, which entitles (but does not
1

See Bank for International Settlements, Semiannual OTC Derivatives
Statistics at end-June 2006, 22B Equity-linked Derivatives by Instrument and Market
(2006), http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm.
2
See Mark P. Gergen & Paula Schmitz, The Influence of Tax Law on Securities
Innovation in the United States: 1981-1997, 52 TAX L. REV. 119 (1997) (describing
various financial instruments); cf, e.g., infra Part VI.D (discussing variable prepaid
forward contracts).
3
See David A. Schizer, Balance In The Taxation Of Derivative Securities: An
Agenda for Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1886, 1886 (2004) ("It is well understood
that aggressive tax planning among high-income individuals and corporations
represents a threat to the U.S. tax system, and that derivatives are staples of this
planning.").
4
See Michael S. Knoll, Financial Innovation, Tax Arbitrage, and Retrospective
Taxation: The Problem With Passive Government Lending, 52 TAX. L. REV. 199, 200
(1997). Professor Knoll states:
Because the tax treatment of even very basic financial contracts is
inconsistent, financially sophisticated parties reduced their tax liabilities by
using innovative financial products and techniques to exploit these
inconsistencies. In its most extreme form, parties can engage in tax
arbitrage, the process of buying and selling the same cash flows to generate
an after-tax cash profit from the different tax treatment of identical cash
flows. Tax arbitrage represents a serious threat to the tax system because
taxpayers, by merely adjusting their portfolios, can reduce or even
eliminate their tax liabilities.

Id.
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obligate) the holder to buy stock at a set price at a certain time in the
future. For example, Maya might buy a call option over XMPL Corp.
stock that entitles her to buy 10,000 shares of XMPL Corp. stock for
$100 per share in five years. Suppose that XMPL Corp. stock is
currently worth $100 per share. The call gives Maya a valuable right
because she will enjoy any appreciation in the stock over $100 per
share without any risk of decline below that price. The Black-Scholes
modee gives Maya a concrete way of valuing her option. Using that
model (and other assumptions discussed later), the option is worth
6
$350,000.
The magic of the Black-Scholes model is that it equates Maya's
call option with a combination of (1) ownership of XMPL Corp. stock
itself and (2) borrowed funds. We will see later how Maya's call
option is equivalent to her owning about 7500 shares of XMPL Corp.
stock (worth $750,000) purchased partly with borrowed funds of
7
$400,000. This combination of stock and borrowing has the same net
value as the call ($350,000). And, it is the starting point in a process
called delta hedging that will closely approximate the economic return
on the call option itself. So, we can think of the stock and borrowing
combination as a synthetic option.
In due course, this article will explain how delta hedging creates
synthetic options. The important point for now is that the BlackScholes model gives us not only a way to value the call option but also
8
to recreate it using stock and borrowing. The Black-Scholes model
has been spectacularly successful, winning Nobel prizes for its
9
inventors and serving as the linchpin for the multi-trillion dollar
5

See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities, 81 J. PoL. EcoN. 637 (1973); see also Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational
Option Pricing, 4 BELLJ.ECON. &MGMT.SCI.141 (1973).
6
See infra note 25.
7
See infra note 27.
8
The more common usage is to refer to the formula as "Black-Scholes." Cf,
e.g., JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES & OTHER DERIVATIVES 234 (5th ed. 2003)
(introducing the "Black-Scholes model"). Some refer to it as the Black-ScholesMerton model. Cf, e.g., NASSIM T ALEB, DYNAMIC HEDGING 109 (1997) (referring to
the "Black-Scholes-Merton" model).
9
Purists might note that there is no "Nobel Prize" in economics as there is for
peace, physics, etc. Technically, it is the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences
in Memory of Alfred Nobel and it was awarded to Robert Merton and Myron Scholes
in 1997 for their work in option pricing theory. Fischer Black was Scholes' coauthor,
but died before the award was made. See Nobel Prize.org, The Prize in Economic
Sciences 1997 (1997), http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1997/
press.html.
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market for derivatives. It does not, however, served as the basis for
taxing options. When Maya buys her call option, she is not taxed as if
she bought XMPL Corp. stock with borrowed funds. Instead, the tax
treatment is held open while Maya waits to see if she will actually
exercise (or perhaps sell) the option. In taxation, timing is almost
0
everything/ and long-term deferral can potentially be the same as tax
forgiveness.
Prior commentators have argued that tax policy should strive to
11
tax economically equivalent transactions similarly. Tax policy can
achieve this goal by what has been termed "bifurcation" - if a
transaction can be bifurcated or broken down into more fundamental
units, then the transaction should be taxed based on the tax treatment
of these units. Inconsistent treatment between the fundamental units
and the transaction creates the potential for economic distortions, tax
arbitrage, and inequities.
Theoretically, then, the proper way to tax Maya's call option is to
tax her as if she bought 7500 shares of XMPL Corp. stock (worth
$750,000) purchased partly with borrowed funds of $400,000. Doing so
is theoretically possible but practically difficult. The primary difficulty
is that the precise amount of stock and borrowing will need to change
over time. For example, suppose Maya really did decide to replicate
the option with the stock and borrowing combination. If XMPL stock
goes down in value, Maya would need to sell some stock (using the
proceeds to pay of some of the borrowing she incurred). If XMPL
stock goes up in value, Maya would need to buy some more stock
(using additional borrowing to pay for it). So, the synthetic option is a
dynamic mixture of stock and borrowing, representing countless sales
and purchases of the underlying stock and changes in the associated
borrowing. The 7500 shares financed in part with $400,000 of
borrowed funds is merely the starting point. Taxing the transactions
that occur after the starting point would be administratively infeasible,
even though the approach is theoretically correct.
Nonetheless, this approach is a valuable policy tool, and it is
possible to examine the taxation of the synthetic option and its
countless transactions using a computer simulation. The simulation
10

See, e.g., Christopher H. Hanna, Demystifying Tax Deferral, 52 SMU L. Rev.
383, 384 (1999) ("Issues relating to tax deferral and time value of money are probably
the most important areas of tax study."); see also Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in
Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986).
11
See, e.g., David Weisbach, 'Fax Responses to Financial Contract Innovation, 50
TAX L. REV. 491, 539 (1995) ("Bifurcation provides a theoretical framework for
taxing hybrids.").
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tells us what the expected tax consequences will be on that dynamic
combination of stock and borrowing that replicates the call option.
Ideally, the tax consequences on the actual option would be the same
as those produced by the simulation. In reality, we should aim for a
practical system that achieves results roughly the same as the ideal
results produced by the simulation. Later in this article, I report the
results of a computer simulation I created using the MATLAB
programming language. Surprisingly, the simulation shows that
current-law treatment of options is, for the most part, the best
approximation of the theoretical ideal. The current-law taxation of
options survives the toughest test that tax theory can apply, but with
one exception.
That exception relates to so-called covered calls, which are the
12
sale of a call combined with ownership of the stock. To illustrate,
suppose we change the example so that Maya already owns 10,000
shares of XMPL Corp. stock. Her adjusted basis in the stock is zero,
meaning she would realize gain of $1 million if she sold the stock
today. Let us also assume that Maya sells a call option over 10,000
shares rather than buying one. So, she is now obligated to sell 10,000
shares of XMPL Corp. stock for $100 per share in five years if the
buyer exercises its right to do so. (And, the buyer will exercise its right
only if the stock is over $100 per share at that time.) Maya receives
cash of about $350,000 for selling this option. Even though Maya
receives cash of $350,000 today, she is not taxed today under current
law. As before, she waits for five years to see whether she must
perform on the call.
Maya's call option is the equivalent of her buying 7500 shares
(worth $750,000) purchased partly with borrowed funds of $400,000.
In contrast, when Maya sells the call, the equivalent combination is
inverted. Now, it is as if she sells 7500 shares (obtaining funds of
$750,000) and lends a portion of the proceeds she obtained (again,
$400,000). Thus, Maya should be taxed as if she sold 7500 shares of
XMPL stock today, recognizing immediate gain of $750,000. Instead,
current law improperly allows Maya to defer the tax consequences of
the implicit sale for five years while she waits to see if she is called
upon to perform under the option.
The article is organized as follows. Part II is an overview of option
theory, which will be used throughout the article. Part III shows how
options challenge the tax system and summarizes how previous
12

The same analysis will apply to protective puts, equity collars, and variable
prepaid contracts. See infra Part VI.
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proposals would deal with this challenge. Part IV shows how the tax
system can achieve the ideal by taxing true options according to
financially equivalent synthetic options, created from transactions in
the underlying stock and debt. Part V explores the taxation of "naked
options" (i.e., option positions that are not coupled with a position in
the actual stock itself) using some simple examples and a more
realistic Monte-Carlo simulation. After examining how naked options
would be taxed under the synthetic-option ideal, Part V concludes
that current law may well be the best practical model available. Part
VI analyzes covered calls and related contracts in a similar fashion.
Practical steps can be taken to improve the taxation of covered calls
and protective puts - namely, treating them as a partial sale of the
owned asset. Part VII has some concluding thoughts.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF OPTION THEORY

A. Option Terms Defined
This article uses terms of art relating to options and short selling.
For convenience, this section defines these terms of art.
1. Long Call: A call option entitles (but does not obligate) the
holder to buy stock at a set price at a set time in the future.
The holder must pay a premium for this right. We will call the
position of a call holder the "long call."

2. Short Call: The holder of a call option has a counterparty (the
call writer) who receives the premium and must sell the stock
if the call is exercised. We will call the position of the call
writer the "short call."
3. Covered Call: A covered call is simply a short call that is
combined with the underlying asset. Without the underlying
asset, the call is naked.
4. Long Put: A put option entitles (but does not obligate) the
holder to sell stock at a set price at a set time in the future.
The holder must pay a premium for this right. We will call the
position of a put holder the "long put."
5. Protective Put: A protective put is simply a long put that is
combined with the underlying asset. Without the underlying
asset, the put is naked.
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6. Short Put: The holder of a put option has a counterparty (the
put writer) who receives the premium and must buy the stock
if the put is exercised. We will call the position of the put
writer the "short put."
An option is specified by the asset (e.g., 100 shares of XYZ Corp.
stock), expiration date (e.g., three years from today), and the exercise
13
price (e.g., $50 per share). This article focuses on options to buy or
sell zero-dividend, publicly-traded stock. In addition, the options in
this article are assumed to be "European," meaning the holder can
14
exercise the option only at the expiration date.
The final concept of this section is short selling. As we will see
later, the magic of the Black -Scholes method for valuing options is
that it equates options with easy-to-value financial positions: debt
(either borrowing or lending) and stock (either owning or selling
short). Borrowing, lending, and owning stock should be familiar.
Selling short may not be, but it is simply the inverse of buying stock. A
leading textbook on investments summarizes short selling as follows:
A short sale allows investors to profit from a decline in a
security's price. An investor borrows a share of stock from a
broker and sells it. Later, the short-seller must purchase a
share of the same stock in the market to replace the share
that was borrowed. This is called covering the short
position ....
The short-seller anticipates the stock price will fall, so that the
share can be purchased at a lower price than it was initially
sold for; the short-seller will then reap a profit. Short-sellers
must not only replace the shares but also pay the lender of
the security any dividends paid during the short sale.
In practice, the shares loaned out for a short sale are typically
provided by a short-seller's brokerage firm .... The owner of
the shares will not even know that the shares have been lent
to the short -seller. If the owner wishes to sell the shares, the
brokerage firm will simply borrow shares from another
investor. Therefore, the short sale may have an indefinite

13

54 (Christina Kouvelis ed., 6th ed. 2005). The
exercise price is often called the strike price. The two terms are synonymous.
14
See HULL, supra note 8, at 705. American options can be exercised at any time
before expiration. See id. at 700.
ZVI BoDIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS
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term. However, if the brokerage firm cannot locate new
shares to replace the ones sold, the short-seller will need to
repay the loan immediately by purchasing shares in the
market and turning them over to the brokerage firm to close
15
out the loan.
As we will see in Part III.B, taxpayers often combine options in
order to approximate the economics of a short sale while avoiding the
short sale's adverse tax treatment. Part VI will present a system for
treating such combinations as short sales for purposes of taxation.

B. Put-Call Parity
This section briefly describes the put-call parity, which relates the
price of stocks, bonds, put options, and call options. As Part liLA
demonstrates, the put-call parity shows that the current-law taxation
of options is internally inconsistent. Part III.B further reveals how the
put-call parity is used to create an approximate short sale, which
avoids the adverse tax consequences of short sales under current law.
Put-call parity relates the value of the stock and options given any
strike price (K) and time to exercise of the option (1) as follows:
S: a share of the stock
c: a call option on the stock, exercisable at time T for
strike price K
p: a put option on the stock, exercisable at time T for_
strike price K
B: a zero-coupon bond that will be worth the strike
6
price K at the time of exercise T
The put-call parity states:
S+p

= B +c. 17

Detailed demonstrations of the put-call parity are available in the
18
legal literature. The most intuitive way to approach the put-call
15

BODIE ET AL., supra note 13, at 91-92.
Because of the future value, we know that B=exp(-r*T).
17
HULL, supra note 8, at 174-75. See generally infra note 18.
ts
See, e.g., MichaelS. Kno II, Put-Call Parity and the Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.
61, 72-74 (2002).
16

144

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 27:135

parity is to note that owning a bond is equivalent to owning stock,
owning a put, and writing a call. In other words,
B

= S + p- c.

Suppose that the strike price of the options and the value of the bond
at maturity are all equal to $100 (i.e., K=$100). We know that the left
side of the equation will equal $100 (i.e., B=$100) regardless of the
price of the stock. As for the right side of the equation, we consider
two cases. In the first case, suppose that the price of the stock is less
than $100. The value of the call is zero, and the investor will exercise
the put, selling the stock for $100. So, the right side is worth $100 in
this first case. In the second case, suppose that the price of the stock is
greater than $100. The value of the put is zero, and the investor will be
called upon to sell the stock for $100 under the call. So, again, the
right side is worth $100 in this second case. Thus, the right side of the
equation is always worth $100.
Part III.A will show how the put-call parity can be used for tax
avoidance. Each of the four transactions listed in the put-call parity
can be recreated by a combination of the other three. For example, we
just saw how a bond can be recreated using a combination of stock, a
put, and a short call. However, the tax treatment of the bond is
different from the tax treatment of the combination. Thus, the put-call
parity might allow taxpayers to choose the tax treatment they prefer.
C. Delta and the Binomial Model

Although the put-call parity demonstrates how taxpayers might
use options to exploit arbitrage opportunities, it does not provide a
unique method for valuing options. The value of a put is dependent on
the value of a call (or vice versa) under put-call parity. Option-pricing
theory supplies the unique price by showing how an option can be
replicated using only stock and debt. Replicating the option using only
stock and debt requires more complex analysis than does the put-call
parity. Before turning to a more realistic model in the next subsection,
we can see the essence of how this replication works using a simple
"binomial" model.
Suppose that ABC stock is worth $30 today and we know it will
be worth either $21 or $45 in one year. What, for example, is the value
of a call option to sell ABC stock for $33, exercisable in one year? Let
us assume that ABC stock has no dividends, and that the interest rate

2007]
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100/10. 19

We know that the option will be worth $12 if the stock goes up to
$45 and will be worth $0 if the stock goes down to $21. We can view
the option as the following tree, with the "?" representing the current
value of the option:

BE
2

$30
?

~
0

The key to valuing the option under the binomial model is observe
how sensitive the return on the option is to changes in the price of the
stock. In this example, a $24 swing in the stock price (i.e., from $21 to
$45) results in a $12 swing in the return on the option (i.e., from $0 to
$12). So, the sensitivity of the option to the price of the stock is 50%.
This figure is known as the "delta" of the option.
We can replicate this sensitivity by buying 0.50 shares of ABC
stock. The 0.50 shares are just as sensitive to movements in the stock
price as is the option itself. Nonetheless, the 0.50 shares are only part
of the replication. They would be worth $10.50 at the end of the year
if the stock price fell to $21, but the option itself would be worthless.
This discrepancy is easy enough to fix. We can assume that the initial
purchase was made partly with borrowed funds - borrowed in an
amount that require a $10.50 repayment in one year. Repayment
would thus wipe out the value of the shares if the share price fell $21.
Alternatively, if the share price goes up to $45, then the 0.50 shares
would be worth $22.50. Paying back the $10.50 would leave $12.00 the same as the actual option. So, we have perfectly replicated the
option by owning 0.50 shares subject to an obligation to repay $10.50
at the end of the one year period.
The initial cost of the option should equal the initial cost of the
replicating portfolio. The 0.50 shares costs $15.00 at the start of the
one year period. The $10.50 final liability brings loan proceeds of
$9.5020 at the start of the one year period. Thus, it costs $5.50 to buy
the replicating portfolio, and the market price of the actual option
should also be $5.50.
19

See David M. Hasen, A Realization-based Approach to the Taxation of
Financial Instruments, 57 TAX L. REV. 397, 431 (2004).
20
$9.50*exp(O.l0*1)=$10.50.
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In summary, the binomial approach shows that a stylized call
option can be replicated with a combination of stock and debt. The
key to this replication is delta, which is the sensitivity of the price of
an option to changes in the price of the stock. The replication is
performed as follows:
•

Buy delta shares of stock. In our example, this was 0.50
shares, costing $15.00.

•

Pay for part of the purchase with an out-of-pocket
contribution that equals the value of the option. In our
example, this was $5.50.

•

Pay the remainder of the purchase with borrowed funds. In
our example, this initial borrowing of $9.50, leading to
repayment of $10.50 in one year.

The binomial model is obviously not the real world. Stock prices
move constantly and can take a multitude of values. The next
subsection will show how one can extend the basic approach just
described in order to replicate real-world options. As in this
subsection, the key to real-world replication is measuring the delta of
an option.
D. Delta Hedging and the Black-Scholes Model
Replicating real-world options with stock and debt is critical to
the approach of this article, which urges that options should be taxed
according to the tax treatment of the replicating portfolio. The BlackScholes model purports to replicate real-world options, even though
stock prices are moving randomly and constantly. At its core, the
Black-Scholes model is the same as the binomial model. Both hold
that an option can be replicated by owning "delta" shares of stock,
combined with an appropriate amount of borrowing. Recall that delta
is the sensitivity of the option price to changes in the stock price. So,
an investor faces the same risk by owning delta shares and owning one
option. As with the binomial model, the replicating portfolio also
includes an appropriate amount of borrowing.
Recall from Part II.A that there are four types of options - long
calls, short calls, long puts, and short puts. The Black-Scholes formula
21
produces a price and a delta for each of these four. 22 Thus, each can

21

The so-called Greek letters describe the sensitivity of an option price to
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be replicated with a position in equity and debt. Long calls and short
puts have positive deltas, meaning they are replicated with stock
ownership and borrowing. Short calls and long puts have negative
deltas, meaning they are replicated with short selling and lending.
Option
Long Call
Short Call
Long Put
Short Put

Replicating Position Replicating Position
in Stock
in Debt
Ownership
Borrowing
Short Selling
Lending
Short Selling
Lending
Ownership
Borrowing

The derivation of the Black-Scholes formula is beyond the scope
of this article, although the approach is similar to the binomial model.
In the binomial model, we needed to know the possible values of the
stock in the next period. In the Black-Scholes model, we assume that
the stock price moves randomly. 23 Now, we need to know the volatility
of the stock. Expanding the example from the prior subsection,
suppose that ABC stock is worth $30 today and has volatility
(standard deviation) of 30%. Again, we are looking for the price and
delta of an option to sell ABC stock for $33, exercisable in one year.
As before, let us assume that ABC stock has no dividends, and that

market inputs. Delta is the most significant of the Greek letters, as it measures
sensitivity of the option price to changes in the stock price. Another is theta, which
measures the sensitivity of an option to passage of time. See HULL, supra note 8, at
309-11. Because the passage of time is constant, there is no need to hedge for theta.
See id. at 311. Another Greek letter is gamma, which measures the sensitivity of delta
to changes in the stock price. See id. at 312. Although gamma is critical to real-world
option traders, it is not addressed in this article. The reason is that gamma cannot be
hedged with the underlying asset itself. Rather, it can be hedged only with other
options. See id. at 313. The other two Greek letters are rho (which measures
sensitivity to interest rate changes) and vega (which measures sensitivity to changes in
volatility). See id. at 316-19. For the sake of simplicity, the model used in this article
will assume that volatility and interest rates are constant.
22
Technically, we can derive all of the deltas from the long call delta, which is
produced by the Black-Scholes equation. Note that the long call delta is always
positive, between 0 and 1. The short call delta is simply the inverse of the long call
delta (and therefore between -1 and 0). The long put delta is the long call delta minus
one (and therefore between -1 and 0). The short put delta is the inverse of the long
put delta (and therefore between 0 and 1).
23
The Black-Scholes model assumes that the return on the stock is a random
variable with a lognormal distribution.
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the interest rate is 10%.24
The Black-Scholes formula gives a value of the option of $3.639325
and a delta of 0.5658. 26 To make the numbers more meaningful, let us
suppose that we are interested in replicating an option covering 10,000
shares. We can take the same approach as before in order to replicate
the call option:
•

Buy delta shares of stock. In our example, this was 5658
shares, costing $169,733.

•

Pay for part of the purchase with an out-of-pocket
contribution that equals the value of the option. In our
example, this was $36,393.

•

Pay the· remainder of the purchase with borrowed funds. In
27
our example, this borrowing is $133,340.

The difference between the Black-Scholes model and the
binomial method of the prior subsection is that the stock price - and
24

Hasen, supra note 19, at 438-39.
I have used the MATLAB programming language to produce the BlackScholes calculations in this article. The function that produces the option price is
blsprice, which takes as its inputs the price of the stock, the strike of the option, the
interest rate, the time to expiration, and the volatility of the stock. Here, blsprice (30,
33, 0.10, 1, 0.30) returns 3.6393.
As another example, recall XMPL Corp. from Part I. The call had a strike price
of $100 and a term of five years, and the current price of the stock was also $100. I
used an interest rate of 4.55% and a stock volatility of 29.92%. (My goal was to create
a realistic option with a round price and delta, but these numbers are typical.) In
MATLAB, blsprice (100, 100, 0.0455, 5, 0.2992) returns $35.0004. After multiplying
by 10,000 (the number of shares covered), I rounded down from $350,004 to $350,000
for sake of convenience.
26
The MATLAB function that produces the delta is blsdelta, which takes the
same inputs as blsprice. Here blsdelta (30, 33, 0.10, 1, 0.30) returns 0.5658.
27
$169,733-$36,393.
As another example, recall XMPL Corp. from Part I. The call had a strike price
of $100 and a term of five years, and the current price of the stock was also $100. I
used an interest rate of 4.55% and a stock volatility of 29.92%. (My goal was to create
a realistic option with a round price and delta, but these numbers are typical.) In
MATLAB, blsdelta (100, 100, 0.0455, 5, 0.2992) returns 0.7500. After multiplying by
10,000 (the number of shares covered), we obtain 7500 shares that replicate the
option. These shares cost $750,000. As the option price is $350,000, see supra note 25,
the equity in the synthetic option must be $350,000. So, the XMPL option is replicated
with a purchased of 7500 shares, worth $750,000, financed in part with debt of
$400,000.
25
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therefore delta - can change before the expiration of the option.
Therefore, we must rebalance the replicating portfolio periodically.
For example, suppose that we are to rebalance the replicating
portfolio weekly. At the end of the first week, the stock price has
jumped from $30 to $30.31.28 The passage of a week and the jump in
29
the stock price causes a change in delta, which is now 0.5763. The
number of shares in the replicating portfolio must now be increased
from 5658 to 5763. The additional 105 shares cost $3183, paid for by
additional borrowing.
The process of rebalancing the replicating portfolio is known as
"delta hedging." The goal of delta hedging is always to own a number
of shares that equals the delta of the option that is being replicated. This
way, the stock ownership and the true option have the same sensitivity
to movements in the stock price. Over time, changes in the stock price
will cause changes in delta. These changes will force the investor to
rebalance the portfolio. This process is detailed in Appendix A.
The goal of Part V will be to implement those steps with a
computer simulation and to measure the tax consequences to an
investor. Implementing the actual trading model is simple, and can be
done with a few lines of computer code.30 The true difficulty comes in
measuring the tax consequences that an investor would face by
creating a synthetic option.
Ill. 0ITIONS AND CHALLENGES TO THE TAX SYSTEM

A. Option Taxation and the Put-Call Parity
The tax aspects of financial innovation have spawned a rich
literature in the law reviews. 31 Perhaps the seminal article is Financial
28

The Black-Scholes price of the option is $37,560. By comparison, the
replicating portfolio is worth $37,897. The 5658 shares of stock are worth $171,494
(i.e., 5658*$30.31). The initial debt of $133,340 has grown to $133,597 (i.e., $133,340
*exp(0.1/52) ).
29
In MATLAB, blsdelta (30.31 , 33, 0.10, 51152, 0.30) returns 0.5763.
3
° Cf, e.g., PAOLO BRANDIMARTE, NUMERICAL METHODS IN FINANCE: A
MATLAB-BASED INTRODUCTION 65 (2002) (giving a MATLAB-based Monte-Carlo
simulation for option valuation).
31
For example, Tax Law Review had an entire issue devoted to the topic. See
David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency and
Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 TAX L. REV. 731 (1995); Mark
P. Gergen, Afterword: Apocalypse Not?, 50 TAX L. REV. 833 (1995); Deborah H.
Schenk, Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L.
REV. 571 (1995); Daniel Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital
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Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, in which Professor
Warren showed that the fundamental problem of current option
32
taxation is its inconsistency with the taxation of other transactions.
First, let us consider the taxation of options, which Professor Warren
summarizes as follows:
The purchase of an option is treated as a capital expenditure,
and there are generally no tax consequences to either party
until its exercise or disposition. If the option lapses without
exercise, the option writer is treated as if he had sold the
option. If a call is exercised, the writer includes the premium
in the amount realized on the sale of the asset, and the holder
of the call includes the premium in cost basis. If a put is
exercised, the writer reduces basis by the amount of the
premium, and the holder of the put reduces amount realized
by the same amount. If an option is sold prior to exercise,
gain or loss is recognized, with the nature of the gain
generally determined by that of the underlying asset. Finally,
many . . . options are written for settlement by a cash
payment from one party to the other on the date of
performance, rather than by the actual delivery of the
property specified in the contract. Such payments with
respect to these cash settlement options . . . are taxable
events.33
The tax system treats options as "contingent-return instruments,"
waiting to apply a tax until the option has resolved itself. Similar
treatment applies to corporate stock itself. Dividends on corporate
Income, 50 TAX L. REV. 643 (1995); Jeff Strnad, Commentary: Taxing New Financial
Products in a Second-Best World: Bifurcation and Integration, 50 TAX L. REV. 545
(1995); David A. Weisbach, Tax Responses to Financial Contract Innovation, 50 TAX
L. REV. 491 (1995).
32
Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy,
107 HARV. L. REv. 460 (1993) [hereinafter Warren 1993].
33
Warren 1993, supra note 32, at 464-65 (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted); accord Alvin C. Warren, Jr., U.S. Income Taxation of New Financial
Products, 88 J. PUB. EcoN. 899, 901-02 (2004) [hereinafter Warren 2004]. The
historical development of option taxation is nicely summarized in Bruce Kayle,
Realization Without Taxation? The Not-So-Clear Reflection of Income From an
Option to Acquire Property, 48 TAX L. REV. 233, 237-42 (1993). As this article does
not address the characterization of option gain and loss, the current-law rules dealing
with character are not addressed. A summary of those rules can be found at David H.
Shapiro, Taxation of Equity Derivatives, 188 TAX MGM'T PORTFOLIO (BNA) 'j[ II.A.3
(2003).
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stock are taxed currently, but appreciation on stock escapes taxation
until the stock is sold or exchanged.34
Contrast this treatment with "fixed-return instruments," such as
bonds. Bonds generate taxable interest income on an annual basis.
Even if the actual payment of interest is deferred during the life of the
bond, the Internal Revenue Code imputes annual interest under its
"original issue discount" regime. 35
Options potentially allow taxpayers to select between contingentreturn and fixed-return tax treatment. 36 The put-call parity implicates
the tax system because the taxation of the four elements is internally
inconsistent. Recall that the put-call parity holds that stock plus a put
equals a bond plus a call. 37 Algebraically S+p=B+c
The left side of the equation (S+p) represents contingent-return
instruments (except insofar as the stock pays dividends). The right
side of the equation (B+c) represents a contingent-return and a fixedreturn instrument.
An investor could use the put-call parity to create a synthetic
bond. Bonds are the prototype for all fixed-return transactions.
However, the put-call parity allows one to receive the economic
return of a bond while paying tax on a contingent-return basis. An
investor could replicate a bond by buying the stock, buying a put, and
selling a call. 38 Why would a taxpayer do this? A true bond generates
taxable interest income on an annual basis, whether or not the bond is
sold. In contrast, the stock, put, and call have no tax consequences
until the sale or (in the case of the put or call) exercise or expiration.39
Although a taxpayer can manipulate the timing of income using
put-call parity, manipulating the character is more difficult. Before the
enactment of section 1258, taxpayers might be able to convert the
ordinary income received from bonds into the capital gains received
from stocks and options. Section 1258 would now treat the synthetic
bond as a "conversion transaction," resulting in ordinary-income
34

See Warren 1993, supra note 32, at 463 (citation omitted); Warren 2004, supra
note 33, at 901.
35
See Warren 1993, supra note 32, at 462-63; Warren 2004, supra note 33, at 900.
36
See Warren 1993, supra note 32, at 470; Warren 2004, supra note 33, at 902.
37
See supra Part II. B.
38
Algebraically, the put-call parity can be rewritten as B=S+p-c.
39
Most or all of the gain on the synthetic bond would be subject to ordinary
income rates, rather than capital gains rates. See I.R.C. § 1258.
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treatment. Section 1258 would not, however, alter the timing of
40
income on the synthetic bond. As before, the synthetic bond would
likely result in contingent-return treatment.
The put-call parity might also be used to achieve an effective
short sale of stock. Rearranging the equation we see -S = p- c- B

In other words, one can replicate the short sale of stock by borrowing
cash, buying a put, and selling a call.
Suppose that Maya currently owns 100 shares of stock, which has
fair market value of $30 per share and an adjusted basis of $0. If Maya
sold the stock she actually owns, then she would pay tax on $3000 of
gain. Before 1997, Maya could have executed a "short sale against the
box." 41 Rather than selling the shares she actually owns, Maya would
execute a short sale over 100 shares of stock (selling 100 shares that
were borrowed from a broker). In 1997, Congress enacted the
constructive-sale rules of section 1259.42 If an investor executes a short
sale and also owns appreciated shares of the same stock, then he is
deemed to have sold the owned stock (rather than the borrowed
stock). The constructive-sale rules apply to a short sale or any
comparable transactions that "have the effect of eliminating
substantially all of the taxpayer's risk of loss and opportunity for
43
income or gain with respect to the [owned security]." So, Maya
would face taxable gain on the 100 shares of if she executes a short
sale or a synthetic short sale, constructed with options. 44 Using put-call
parity, Maya could create a synthetic short sale by buying a put,
selling a call, and borrowing money. Using the notation introduced
above, we describe a short sale (i.e., a negative share of stock) as
follows:
-S

= p- c- B

Again, suppose that the stock is worth $30 today, and Maya wants to
execute a synthetic short sale. She would borrow $30, buy a put, and
40

I.R.C. § 1258.
The short sale is "against the box" because Maya already holds the same
shares that she is shorting.
42
See David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 1312, 1343 (2001).
43
See id. at 1344 n.104 (quoting JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION IN 1997 (Comm. Print 1997)).
44
See I.R.C. § 1259.
41
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sell a call. The term of the put and call would have to be the same, and
the exercise price of the each would have to be the future value of $30.
So, if the term of the option is one year and the interest rate is 5%, the
exercise price would need to be $31.5445 for both the call and the put.
In conceptual terms, the long put and short call eliminates any risk of
upward or downward movement in the stock for one year. The
borrowing allows Maya to access the value of the owned stock today,
rather than having to wait to sell it. The resulting synthetic short sale
perfectly mimics a true short sale and would be taxed as a constructive
sale under current law.
B. Equity Collars
In his 2001 article Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, Dean
Schizer notes how taxpayers can approximate a short sale against the
box, but still avoid the constructive sale rules, with an equity collar.46
Like the synthetic short sale, an equity collar combines a long put with
a short call. The difference, however, is that the equity collar has a
spread in exercise prices between the two options.
Let us return to Maya and her ABC stock currently worth $30.
An equity collar might be a long put with an exercise price of $27 and
a short call with an exercise price of $33. Here, there is a spread of $6
between the two exercise prices - probably enough of a spread to
47
avoid the constructive sale rules. The following illustrates the return
on a short sale of ABC stock and the equity collar just described. The
horizontal axis is the price of the stock in one year. The vertical axis is
the gross return (above or below the current stock price of $30) on the
transactions in one year.

4

~ $31.54 is the future value of $30 after one year at 5% interest ($30*e"0.05).

4

See Schizer, supra note 42, at 1345-47.
Dean Schizer reports that the folk wisdom of the New York tax bar is that a
spread of 10% to 20% of the value of the owned asset should avoid the constructive
sale rules. See id. at 1346 n.llO.
b
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The illustration shows how similar an equity collar is to a short sale.
Despite the similarities, the short-sale triggers the constructive sale
rules, whereas the equity collar does not.
Economically, however, an equity collar is a partial short sale.
This article will urge that the equity collar should be taxed as a
constructive sale (regardless of the spread). Determining the actual
extent to which an equity collar is a short sale (e.g., 50%, 75%) is no
trivial matter. The put-call parity does not supply the answer to this
question, because it deals only with long puts and short calls that
perfectly replicate a short sale. In order to find the degree to which an
equity collar replicates (however imperfectly) a short sale, one must
turn to the Black-Scholes model and the model's key concept of
"delta."
We can easily determine the initial short sale implied by the
equity collar just described. The delta on the put is -0.202048 and the
delta on the call is ~0.5658. So, the delta on the collar is the sum of
the two, or -0.7678. If the collar covered 10,000 shares, Maya has
essentially executed a short sale over 7678 of those shares. Applying
the constructive sale rules of section 1259 to the implicit short sale
49

48

In MATLAB, blsdelta (30, 27, 0.10, 1, 0.30) returns -0.2020 for the put.
In MATLAB, blsdelta (30, 33, 0.10, 1, 0.30) returns 0.5658 for the call. See
supra text accompanying note 26. Because we are dealing with a short call, we take
the inverse of the given delta.
49
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means that Maya would be treated as having sold up to 7678 shares of
ABC stock. There are some serious (but surmountable) complications
with this approach. One is that delta depends on the volatility of a
stock, which is not readily determinable. Another is that delta is
constantly fluctuating along with fluctuating stock prices. These issues
are fully dealt with in Part VI.
C. Academic Proposals

Because of the size of the market for options and their use in tax
avoidance, option taxation has attracted considerable attention from
legal academics. This section summarizes some of the existing
commentary, especially as it relates to the approach of this article.
1. Spanning Method
In his 1993 article, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual
Framework, Professor Strnad identifies universality and consistency as
ideals that the tax system should strive to achieve in the taxation of
financial transactions.50 "Universality requires that the tax system
specify a tax treatment for every possible transaction."51 Universality
gives taxpayers certainty about the tax treatment of transactions. The
second goal is consistency. "A tax system is consistent if and only if
every cash flow pattern has a unique tax treatment. In such a system,
it is not possible to manipulate tax outcomes by repackaging cash
flows into different financial vehicles."52 The discussion of the put-call
party in Part III.A showed the inconsistency of taxing options the
same way as pure equity.
Professor Strnad notes that a bifurcation approach accomplishes
the goals of universality and consistency. Bifurcation is accomplished
as follows: First, we see if a transaction can be broken down into
constituent parts. Second, we identify tax treatment of each part.
Third, we aggregate the tax results on the constituent parts. This
bifurcation approach is consistent and universal. Another favorable
aspect of bifurcation is its continuity. A system is continuous if
transactions that are nearly identical have nearly identical tax
treatments. 53 Thus, "small changes in any [transaction] will not cause a
50

Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46
569, 572-73 (1994).

STAN. L. REV.
51

52

53

/d.

!d. at 573.
See generally supra note 50.
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'jump' in the tax results."54 Equity collars have a discontinuous tax
treatment, because if the spread between the put and call is too
narrow, they trigger the constructive sale rules. 55 As a result, small
changes in the spread can cause large changes in the tax
consequences.
Professor Strnad analyzes the taxation of options under a stylized
model called the "spanning method," under which a stock that will
take one of five known values in two years. 56 This model does not
reflect the real world, and may well be incapable of capturing the
effect that innumerable price fluctuations have on the performance of
real-world options. Like Professor Strnad's spanning method, the
delta-hedging model of this article relies on bifurcation to examine the
taxation of options. The delta-hedging model improves upon the
spanning method, however, by its ability to produce tax results for
real-world options.
2. Quasi-Mark-to-Market Approach
Professor Hasen used delta hedging to support his proposal of
what he calls a quasi-mark-to-market approach for taxing options.57
Hasen recognizes that delta hedging produces results that are
equivalent to actual options and would base the taxation of actual
options on a hypothetical delta hedge. As in this article, Hasen's delta
hedging model bifurcates a call option into stock and debt. Yet,
Hasen's model departs from the bifurcation ideal by not taxing the
stock component according to current law. Instead, Hasen would tax
the stock component of the synthetic option by marking it to market.
Let us recall how delta hedging can be used to replicate a long
58
cal1. The Black-Scholes formula produces a number "delta," which is
the sensitivity of the price of the long call to movements in the price of
the stock. An investor can theoretically replicate an option by buying
a number of shares equal to this delta, financing part of the purchase
with borrowing. Consider the following example that Professor Hasen
uses to describe his delta-hedging approach:
ABC stock is worth $30 on Day 1 and has moderate volatility
of 30%. On Day 1, when the risk-free rate of interest is 10%,
54
55

56

57
58

Strnad, supra note 50, at 598.
See supra Part III.B.
See Strnad, supra note 50, at 593 & n.65.
See Hasen, supra note 19, at 443.
See id. at 430--31.
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B sells A an option to buy ABC stock at $33 on Day 2, one
year later. The price of the option is $3.64. At all times from
Day 1 to Day 2 B is the record owner of the ABC stock. ABC
stock pays no dividends. 59
Hasen reports that the delta equals 56.75%!0 A's taxable year ends six
months later, at which time Hasen assumes that the stock has
increased in value to $35.08.61 Hasen reports an option value of $5 and
a delta of 73.57%.62
A synthetic option is initialized by the purchase of delta=0.5675
shares of ABC stock, which costs $17.03. The purchase is financed by
$3.64 (the price of the call) out of pocket and $13.39 of borrowing.63
Six months later, the synthetic option will be represented by
delta=0.7357 shares (worth $25.81) and borrowing of $20.81 (i.e., the
value of the shares minus the value of the option). Professor Hasen's
goal is finding the appropriate tax treatment for this six-month period.
The problem, however, is that a synthetic option involves daily or
more frequent trading to ensure that the number of shares always
equals delta. We cannot know what tax consequences these trades and
the related borrowing have based solely on the value at the end of six
months.
In order to approximate the actual tax consequences, Hasen
posits a single adjustment to the portfolio midway between Day 1 and
the end of the taxable year six months later. The interim adjustment
comes from the hypothetical purchase of 0.1682 new shares, reflecting
the increase in delta from 0.5675 to 0.7357. Hasen deems this purchase
to have been made at a share price of $32.54 (i.e., the midway point
between $35.08 and $30).64
Professor Hasen would tax the initial stock purchase and the
interim purchase on a mark-to-market basis. This system, which he
calls a "quasi-mark-to-market approach," produces gains as follows.

59
60

61

62

ld. at 438-39.
ld. at 439. Hasen's number for delta is slightly off. The correct delta is 56.58%.
Id. at 444.

Jd. Both of these numbers are slightly off. The correct price is $5.03, and the
correct delta is 73.56%.
63
/d. at 439.
64
See id. at 447. This assumption seems contrary to Hasen's goal of avoiding
"off-market transactions." Cf id. at 443 ("[I]f one simplified using off-market
transactions to approximate option transactions, one would substantially undercut the
utility of using the dynamic hedging model in the first place, because the value of the
model lies in its establishment of transactional equivalents.").
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There are gains of $2.88 on the initial purchase65 and $0.43 on the
interim· purchase.66 As a result, Hasen would subject A to short-term
capital gains of $3.31. Professor Hasen appears also to allow A an
interest deduction of $0.77 on the imputed debt.67 The net income
would be $2.54.
This result obviously deviates from the realization rule. Under the
realization rule, A would have no gain at all for year one, because she
has only bought nondividend-paying stock and borrowed money.
Indeed, A might even be entitled to an interest deduction. Professor
Hasen justifies deviation from the realization rule by addressing the
"policy question of whether it is appropriate to tax the gain on the
value of the underlying asset during the pendency of the option or to
wait until some future date." 68 The realization rule gives one, rather
clear, answer to this policy question, although there is no reason
Hasen should not argue for a better answer. 69
But his answer points to full (not quasi) mark-to-market
treatment of the option itself. In Hasen's example, the option price
has increased only $1.36 (from $3.64 to $5.00), although he would
impute income of $2.54. Hasen wants to avoid marking the option to
market to "avoid the difficulty of actually computing the spot prices of
the option on a daily basis (or in principle even more frequently). " 70
Yet, taxing the option on a mark-to-market basis would typically
require only a single year-end valuation of the option.71 In fact, valuing
65

0.5675*($35.08-$30).
0.1682*(35.08-32.54).
~ See Hasen, supra note 19, at 445 & n.146 (calculating interest of $0.12 on the
borrowing associated with the interim purchase and calculating interest of $0.65 on
the borrowing associated with the initial purchase).
68
See id. at 445.
69
It is likely that most academics would support a fuller mark-to-market regime.
See Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism,
and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L REV. 861, 861-62 (1997).
Professor Zelinsky states:
66

Much contemporary scholarly literature promotes the alternative vision of
accretionist taxation, under which the taxpayer either pays tax periodically
on increases in his net worth, without waiting for a realization event, or
pays upon realization an additional deferral charge, to compensate the fisc
for the time-value of the taxes the taxpayer would have paid earlier under a
true accretionist regime.
/d.
70

Hasen, supra note 19, at 444.
The initial value of the option would typically be set by an arm's length
transaction. Receipt of a gratuitous or compensatory option would, however, require
71
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the option is no more difficult than calculating delta, as the formula
for both have the same dependent variables.72 Marking the option to
market is no more difficult than performing the delta calculations that
Hasen proposes.
At a conceptual level, this article approaches the taxation of
options in a manner similar to Hasen's. Delta hedging gives us a way
to break options down into more fundamental transactions. However,
this article accepts as a reality the fact t~at these fundamental
transactions have clear tax treatments that are rather uncontroversial
outside the academy. Modeling this reality - including the realization
rule - is the goal of this article.
3. Professor Shuldiner's Formula Interest
The spirit of this article is most in line with the framework given
by Professor Warren and the bifurcation models of Professors Strnad
and Hasen. There are, however, other noteworthy proposals to reform
the taxation of options. Professor Reed Shuldiner has proposed tax
consequences for options based on implicit interest. Professor
Shuldiner would impute interest income to the holder of puts and
calls, based on the amount of premium paid. 73 Shuldiner gives the
following example (subject to an interest rate of 10% ):
Diva enters into a cash-settlement call option with David to
purchase 10,000 ounces of silver in two years at $12 per
ounce. Diva pays David $10,000 for the option....
Diva has purchased an asset for $10,000 which she is
presumed to expect to increase in value to$ 11,000 by the end
of the first year and to $12,100 by the end of the second year.
Diva should accordingly have income of $1000 in the first
year and $1100 in the second year. 74
Shuldiner's approach actually imputes interest income in the
opposite direction from a delta-hedging approach. Shuldiner does not
supply a current price of silver nor its volatility in his example.
an initial valuation.
72
Delta and the call price are both functions of the same variables: the risk-free
rate, stock volatility, time to exercise, the strike price, and the market price. See
HULL, supra note 8, at 246, 303.
73
See Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of Financial
Instruments, 71 TEX. L. REV. 243,308-10 (1992).
74
See id.
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Nevertheless, a current price of $9 per ounce and a volatility of
75
26.02% are consistent with the example. With these parameters,
delta is 47.84%.76 Rather than buying an option over 10,000 ounces of
silver for $10,000, Diva could alternatively buy 4784 ounces of silver.
The cost would be $43,056,77 which would be financed with $10,000 out
of pocket (representing the premium) and $33,056 of debt. If we
simply project this debt over the next two years, Diva would have year
one interest expense of $330678 and year two interest expense of
79
$3636.
Recall that Professor Warren had identified two basic tax regimes:
fixed return and contingent return. Current law treats options as
contingent-return transactions, whereas Professor Shuldiner would
treat them as fixed-return transactions. Option theory shows that an
option is neither fixed- nor contingent-return in its entirety. Instead, it
is a hybrid of the two. 80
4. Proposals for Covered Calls
Professor Calvin Johnson has argued that the premium received
on a short call should be taxable as ordinary income if the call writer
owns the underlying asset (i.e., writes a covered call).81 The amount of
income would be equal to the lesser of (1) the premium received or
(2) the unrealized appreciation in the underlying property. This
approach relies on an accounting concept of income, focusing on the
cash received rather than the elimination of risk in the underlying
asset. Thus, this approach fails to reach a protective put, which an
investor pays for, even though a protective put can eliminate risk as
well as a covered call. Also, the approach would not reach an equity
collar either, even though it yields a relatively certain cash return but
at a future date.
Professors Cunningham and Schenk would treat the sale of a

75

In MATLAB, blsprice(9*10000, 12*10000, 0.1, 2, 0.2602) = 9999.7.
In MATLAB, blsdelta(9*10000, 12*10000, 0.1, 2, 0.2602) = 0.47835.
77
4784*9.
78
$33,056*10%.
79
($33,056+$3306)*10%.
8
° Cf Warren 2004, supra note 33, at 903 ("Although an actual call is subject to
wait-and-see taxation because the return is contingent, such a synthetic call would
produce current interest for the holder.").
81
See Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing the Income from Writing Options, 73 TAX
NOTES 203 (Oct. 14, 1996).
76
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covered call as the sale of part of the underlying asset. 82 Bruce Kayle
has a similar approach. He used an example in which a taxpayer owns
1000 shares of stock with fair market value of $100 and adjusted basis
of $40 per share.~3 Rather than selling a covered call with a strike price
of $100, the taxpayer might create an economically equivalent
partnership. The partnership has two classes of ownership. Class 1 analogous· to the covered call - entitles the owner to all proceeds
from the pre-established sale over $100. Class 2 - analogous to the
retained rights - entitles the owner to all dividends until the sale, plus
all sale proceeds up to $100 per share. In Mr. Kayle's example, the
taxpayer sells Class 1 for $5000, retaining Class 2. Mr. Kayle concludes
that the taxpayer would have gain of $3000 from the sale. Because
Class 2 replicates a covered call, Mr. Kayle suggests that the covered
call could have similar tax treatment.
Mr. Kayle's approach would determine the taxation of the
covered call by analogy to a more complicated transaction (classes of
a partnership or trust). The approach of this article, in contrast, is to
determine the taxation of options by their financial equivalence to
more fundamental transactions (stock ownership, short selling,
borrowing, and lending). Once a consistent system for taxing options
is found, we could possibly invert Mr. Kayle's approach, applying the
option-tax rules to partnership interests like Class 2.
Finally, David Schizer has suggested an approach for dealing with
equity collars based on the delta of a stock. Recall that an equity
collar combines a long put with a short call and acts as a substitute for
a short sale. 84 If the spread in an equity collar is wide enough, it will
avoid the constructive sale rules. Schizer notes that one could
calculate the delta of the equity collar in order to determine the extent
to which any collar should trigger the constructive sale rules. 85 Schizer
does not, however, develop this idea fully, stating "although the delta
approach is theoretically intriguing, it is probably not practical. " 86 Part
III.B already gave a preliminary example of this approach. Part VI.D
of this article will attempt to develop this idea more fully and will
ultimately propose it as a way of dealing with covered calls, protective
puts, and equity collars.87
82

Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A
"Revolutionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725,775-84 (1992).
83
Kayle, supra note 33, at 273.
84
See supra Part III.B.
85
See Schizer, supra note 42, at 1364-67.
86
See id. at 1367.
87
Some commentary has argued that hedging transactions should not trigger
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IV. THE SYNTHETIC OPTION AS A POLICY IDEAL

A. Theoretical Case for Taxing True Options According to Synthetic
Options
Option theory works in financial markets because it equates
options with liquid, easy-to-value transactions. Owning a call option is
financially equivalent to owning a certain amount of the underlying
stock and borrowing a certain amount of money.88 The difference in
value between the stock ownership and the indebtedness - the equity
in the position - should closely approximate the value of the option.
Thus, one could say that option theory successfully bifurcates call
options into stock and debt. The goal of this article is to apply this
approach to the taxation of options.
Taxing financial contracts according to their constituent parts is
theoretically the strongest policy response to financial contract
89
innovation. A particular strength of this bifurcation approach is its
"continuity,"90 which ensures that small changes to a transaction do
not result in large changes to its tax treatment. Recall the problem of
equity collars, described in Part III.B. An equity collar is used as a
substitute for a short sale by taxpayers. Unlike short sales, however,
equity collars can be structured to avoid the constructive sale rules of
section 1259. Yet at some point the spread between the call and the
put becomes too narrow, and the constructive sale rules are engaged.
Thus, the current-law taxation of equity collars is discontinuous.
Bifurcating the equity collar into a short sale and bond avoids this
discontinuity. By definition, an equity collar is a long put and short
call, both of which can be decomposed into short selling and debt
investing. By determining the amount of short selling inherent in the
long put and in the short call, we can determine the extent to which
any equity collar should trigger the constructive sale rules. Small
changes in the equity collar would thus result in small changes in the
realization. See, e.g., Deborah L. Paul, Another Uneasy Compromise: The Treatment
of Hedging in a Realization Income Tax, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (1996).
88
See Appendix A for detailed steps.
89
See Weisbach, supra note 11, at 539.
90
Professor Strnad identifies another goal - consistency. Consistency ensures
that unique cash flows have a unique tax result. Consistency may well be satisfied
under current-law taxation of options. It would be quite difficult for most taxpayers to
create a synthetic option because of the necessity of frequent trading (and the
resulting trading costs). Those taxpayers capable of creating synthetic options are
almost certainly dealers who are subject to market-to-market taxation whether they
hold true options or synthetic options.
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amount of constructive sale that is triggered.
A similar approach can be taken with the synthetic bond
described in Part III.B. There, we saw that a bond can be created by
buying stock, buying a put, and selling a call. This combination is
similar to the equity collar (a long put and short call) plus stock
ownership. As we just saw, a long put and short call are both
combinations of short selling and lending. In this case, it is the implicit
lending that is important. If the tax laws imputed interest income on
this lending, then the synthetic bond would offer no tax benefits.
Prior commentators have criticized the bifurcation approach as
being unsound because of the lack of unique units by which
transactions can be analyzed. 91 One commentator quipped, "There are
no fundamental individual particles such as quarks in the financial
world." 92 Yet, breaking transactions into fundamental particles is
precisely what the Black-Scholes method does. The four fundamental
units are owning stock, short selling stock, borrowing money, and
lending money. Setting aside short selling for a moment, we should
see that the tax rules for the other three transactions are familiar and
unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. 93 Stock ownership gives
rise to dividend income and gain or loss upon sale. Borrowing and
lending money gives rise to interest expense and income. These three
transactions are not commonly considered to be "derivatives," as we
do not think that the economic returns on borrowing, lending, and
stock ownership are based on other financial transactions. As for short
selling, it is not as familiar as the other three transactions and its tax
treatment is perhaps less stable, being radically changed in 1997.94 Yet,
91

See Randall K.C. Kau, Carving Up Assets and Liabilities - Integration or
Bifurcation of Financial Products, 68 TAXES 1003, 1005-07 (Dec. 1990); Edward D.
Kleinbard, Beyond Good and Evil Debt (And Debt Hedges): A Cost of Capital
Allowance System, 67 TAXES 943, 947-55 (Dec. 1989); Weisbach, supra note 11, at 512
(citing David P. Hariton, New Rules Bifurcating Contingent Debt - A Mistake? , 51
TAX NOTES 235, 237-38 (Apr. 15, 1991)).
92
See Kau, supra note 91, at 1007 (quoted in Weisbach, supra note 11, at 512).
93
Here, I am referring to the timing of income and deductions. The actual rate
that applies to many of these transactions is quite volatile because of changing capitalgains rates over the past twenty years.
94
Cf BORIS I. BITTKER& LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, AND GIFTS 57-97, 'Jl 57.8.2 n.4 (3d ed. 2000); David Schizer, Debt
Exchangeable for Common Stock: Electivity and the Tax Treatment of Issuers and
Holders, 1 DERIVATIVES REP. 10 (Mar. 2000); David M. Schizer, Hedging Under
Section 1259, 80 TAX NOTES 345 (July 20, 1998); David Weisbach, Should a Short Sale
Against the Box be a Realization Event?, 50 NAT'L TAX J . 495 (1997); Robert Willens,
TRA '97 Closes Loopholes for Tax Deferral and Conversion of Gains Into Dividend
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short selling should still be considered a fundamental transaction
because it is the inverse of stock ownership.
Thus, our fundamental particles are two pairs of inverse
transactions: (1) borrowing and its inverse, lending, and (2) stock
ownership and its inverse, short selling. These transactions are the
fundamental building blocks that option theory uses to price options.
They are also the building blocks that this article uses to examine the
taxation of options.

B. The Timing of Tax Items
The total gain or loss on a synthetic option will be very close to
the total gain or loss on a true option. After all, the whole point of the
synthe6c call is to replicate the economic return from a true option.
As a result, we can be sure that current law gets the amount of gain or
loss on options right. The interesting issue is whether the timing of
gain or loss is correct.
Under current law, an option generates only one tax item either gain or loss at some realization event (e.g., upon exercise or
expiration). Under the approach of this article, an option generates
several tax items based upon the tax items that a synthetic option
generates. Recall that long calls and short puts are replicated with
stock ownership and borrowing.95 These options produce gain or loss
from trading in the stock and interest expense from the borrowing.
Short calls and long puts are replicated with short selling and lending.
These options produce gain or loss from the short selling and interest
income from the lending.
Unlike current law, the delta-hedging approach of this article
does not defer all tax items to some future realization event.
Measuring the timing of these tax items requires some assumptions,
which are summarized as follows:
1. All tax items are taken into account immediately. So, interest
income that is paid on October 1 is taken into account
immediately, rather than on December 31 or April 15 of the
following year. This assumption simplifies the calculations in
the simulation.

2. Characterization is disregarded. The focus is solely on the
timing of income. This assumption may well be the most
Income, 87 J. TAX'N 197 (1997).
95
See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
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limiting, as characterization has such a dramatic effect on tax
rates under current law.96
3. Deductions for losses and interest are fully useable.

97

4. Interest expense is deductible immediately, even though the
simulation calculates interest as being capitalized.98
5. All positions are liquidated at the expiration date. So, gain or
loss is not deferred past the expiration date, giving us a set
period during which to compare the timing of tax items from
the true option and the synthetic option.
The synthetic option produces a series of tax items over its
lifetime. The future value of these items can be determined as of the
expiration date. We can view this future value as the ideal measure of
gain or loss on the option. This future value can thus be compared
with the current-law treatment of the true option, which produces gain
or loss only upon the exercise date.
The ultimate goal is the accurate timing of income, subject to the
realization requirement. Some might assert that an even more
accurate measurement of income would come from mark-to-market
taxation of the synthetic option.99 However, mark-to-market taxation
96

Compare I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(C) (applying a 15% top rate to net capital gain),
with I.R.C. § l(i)(2) (applying a 35% top rate to ordinary income).
97
But cf I.R.C. § 1211(b) (limiting the current deductibility of capital losses to
capital gains plus $3000).
9
R The interest is potentially deductible as investment interest because it is "paid
or accrued on indebtedness properly allocable to property held for investment."
I.R.C. § 163(d)(3)(A). Investment interest is deductible, subject to two caveats worthy
of note. First, the deduction cannot exceed an individual taxpayer's "net investment
income." See I.R.C. § 163(d)(1). We can comfortably assume that the taxpayer has
sufficient investment income to allow for a full interest deduction. After all, well-todo taxpayers are the ones most likely to buy equity options. Second, and more
significantly, a cash-basis taxpayer must pay the interest in cash before he can take a
deduction. See Davison v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 35 (1996), affd 141 F.3d 403 (2d
Cir. 1998). We could assume that our investor pays this interest out of his own funds.
This assumption would give our synthetic option a different cash flow from the true
option, which requires no interim payments. Or, our investor might switch his method
of accounting to the accrual method. Again, however, the true option does not
mandate this switch. Finally, and perhaps most consistent with the simulation, we can
assume that the investor borrows money from a new lender at the end of each year to
pay the year's interest expense.
99
C.f, e.g., MichaelS. Knoll, An Accretion Corporate Income Tax, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1996); John Lee, President Clinton's Capital Gains Proposals, 59 TAX NOTES
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of the synthetic option 1s the same as mark-to-market taxation of the
option itself, 100 because the economic value of the synthetic option
should track the economic value of the true option. Because the
realization rule is so firmly entrenched, this article does not consider a
mark-to-market system for taxing options.
The simulation must measure the timing of two types of tax items:
(1) interest expense or income and (2) gain or loss from trading.
Measuring the timing of interest is computationally straightforward.
Recall for example that a synthetic long call is created by the purchase
of delta shares of stock, financed in part by borrowing. We can assume
that the borrowing generates interest at the same rate used in the
Black-Scholes formula. Measuring the gain or loss from trading is
more difficult. As time passes and the stock price fluctuates, the
investor would need to rebalance the debt/stock portfolio. The goal is
always to have the number of shares owned equal delta. When delta
falls, for example, the investor would need to sell some stock,
generating gain or loss on the sale. Measuring this gain or loss requires
us to adopt some system of inventory accounting, discussed using an
example in the next section.
C. A Simple Simulation

Recall the ABC stock example used above, drawn from Professor
Hasen's article:
ABC stock is worth $30 on Day 1 and has moderate volatility
of 30%. On Day 1, when the risk-free rate of interest is 10%,
B sells A an option to buy ABC stock at $33 on Day 2, one
year later. The price of the option is $3.64. At all times from
Day 1 to Day 2 B is the record owner of the ABC stock. ABC
. 'dends.101
stock pays no d1v1
Let us assume that an investor wants to replicate this call option, but
over 10,000 shares. The call option has an initial value of $36,393 and
an initial delta of 56.58%. So, the investor must initially buy 5658
shares, at a total cost of $169,740. The investor pays for this purchase
with $36,393, borrowing the balance of $133,347.

1399 (June 7, 1993) (proposing mandatory passthrough of income or loss as to private
C corporations and mark-to-market accrual taxation of shareholders of public C
corporations).
100
See supra notes 70--72 and accompanying text.
101
Hasen, supra note 19, at 438-39.
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Hasen's example has the stock at $35.08 six months later. To
demonstrate how the synthetic option should work, I gen~rated a
series of random walks that the stock could take, and captured the
first that ended at $35.08. I assumed that each step was one week long.
At each step, I calculated delta and rebalanced the debt/stock
mixture. New purchases of stock are financed with new borrowing.
Sales of stock produce cash that reduces previous borrowing. The
results are summarized as follows:
Option
Beginning Value
Shares
Week
0 $
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
ll
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

$

Stock
30.00
30.31
31.50
32.33
34.16
36.07
36.71
36.56
35.62
38.09
39.78
36.39
36.92
33.59
34.21
35.93
37.60
40.38
39.50
41.04
40.33
38.74
37.42
36.94
36.50
34.81
35.08

36,393
10,000
Delta
0.5658
0.5763
0.6239
0.6550
0.7205
0.7798
0.7973
0.7930
0.7647
0.8328
0.8702
0.7871
0.8025
0.6868
0.7101
0.7715
0.8225
0.8881
0.8712
0.9027
0.8909
0.8567
0.8209
0.8063
0.7918
0.7242
0.7356

Total
EndinJ;?;

True
!Option
Synthetic
!Option

$

50,268

$

49,581

Shares
Bought
5658
105
476
311
655
593
175
(43)
(283)
681
374
(831)
154
(1157)
233
614
510
656
(169)
315
(118)
(342)
(358)
(146)

(145)
(676)
114

Borrowed
Cost
133,347
3183
14,994
10,055
22,375
21,390
6424
(1572)
(10,080)
25,939
14,878
(30,240)
5686
(38,864)
7971
22,061
19,176
26,489
(6676)
12,928
(4759)
(13,249)
(13,396)
(5393)
(5293)
(23,532)
3999
197,840

Interest
0
256
263
292
312
356
398
411
409
390
441
470
413
425
351
367
410
447
499
487
513
505
481
456
446

437
392
10,627

Cumulative
Cost
133,347
136,786
152,043
162,390
185,077
206,823
213,645
212,483
202,811
229, 141
244,459
214,689
220,788
182,349
190,670
213,098
232,684
259,621
253,444
266,859
262,614
249,870
236,954
232,016
227,170
204,075
208,467

The ending value of the synthetic option is the value of the owned
stock (7356 shares at $35.08 per share, or $258,048) minus the
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cumulative borrowing and interest ($208,467). Thus, the synthetic
option is worth $49,581, fairly close to the Black-Scholes value of
$50,268. The results would be even closer using daily, rather than
weekly, rebalancing.
The synthetic option produces interest expense of $10,627 in the
current year, and the timing of this interest is obvious from the
spreadsheet. However, there was also buying and selling of stock. The
buying has no direct tax consequences, but the selling produces
taxable gain or loss, the measurement of which is not obvious. Perhaps
the most realistic approach to measuring the gains and losses from
trading would be to assume strategic behavior by the investor. The
investor would select the particular stocks to sell so as to minimize
gains and maximize losses, subject to the wash-sale rules. Strategic
trading is allowed by Treasury regulations, 102 subject to the wash-sale
rules (discussed below).
Ultimately however I chose not to present such a simulation. One
reason is complexity. Strategic trading assumes that the taxpayer
maintains an inventory of stock, purchased on different dates, with
each having a unique adjusted basis. 103 Modeling strategic trading
leads to complex, less readable computer code. Another reason for
not presenting the model with strategic trading is the lack of symmetry
between short and long positions. If the investor is assumed to trade
strategically, then we can expect the investor to trade differently
depending on whether he is replicating for example a long call or a
short call. So, the taxable gain produced by a long call may be
different from the taxable loss produced by the short call.
The simulation I prepared uses a weighted-average-cost basis. At
any particular time, each share held by the investor has the same
adjusted basis, which equals the average cost of the prior purchases.
This approach simplifies the programming code, because only one
adjusted basis is needed at any time. Moreover, if the realization rule
is taken as a constraint, a weighted-average-cost approach is arguably
the best measure of income. 104 The stock or short sales that constitute
the synthetic are fungible. Selling one versus another does not affect
102

See Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(c) (as amended in 1996).

103

I actually did prepare a simulation that models strategic trading, subject to the
wash-sale rules, and the resulting programming code is rather le ngthy and abstruse.
104

Cf. Simon D. Ulcickas, Note, Internal Revenue Code Section 1259: A
Legitimate Foundation for Taxing Short Sales Against the Box or a Mere Makeover? ,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1355, 1368 n.86 (1998) (citing DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, 1996 GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S REVENUE
PROPOSALS 70-71 (1996)).
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the pre-tax returns enjoyed by the taxpayer. Although there are other
plausible methods of inventory accounting for the securities, 105 only
the weighted-average-cost method is presented in this article.
The weighted-average-cost method is not allowed by current law,
although it was proposed by the Clinton administration. 106 Another
deviation from current law in this simulation is the absence of washsale rules. The wash-sale rules potentially disallow a loss on the sale of
stock if either (1) the taxpayer retains other shares of the same stock
purchased thirty days before the date of sale or (2) the taxpayer buys
other shares of the same stock thirty days after the date of sale. 107 The
purpose of the wash-sale rules is to restrain strategic trading that
could realize losses and defer gains. 108 Under the weighted-averagecost simulation however there is no possibility for strategic behavior.
The timing of trades is determined solely by movements in delta, and
the weighted-average-cost method thwarts the taxpayer's ability to
select high-basis stock to sell. In short, using a weighted-average-cost
method and eliminating the wash-sale rules represent a simplifying
compromise that reflects economic income while retaining the
realization rule.
Let us return to the prior example, recalling that the option
produced an interest expense of $10,627 in the first taxable year. Now
that we have an inventory method, we can calculate the gain or loss on
the sales that the movement in delta forces. That reckoning is as
follows:

105

Perhaps the best candidate is the "first-in-first-out" method allowed by Treas.
Reg.§ 1.1012-1(c)(1). Treas. Reg.§ 1.1012-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1996).
106
See Ulcickas, supra note 104.
107
See I.R.C. § 1091.
108
See David Schizer, Scrubbing the Wash Sale Rules, 82 TAXES 67, 67 (Mar.
2004) ("[Without limitations on losses] the 'timing option' inherent in the realization
rule would allow taxpayers to defer gains (thereby reducing the tax's present value)
while accelerating losses (thereby preserving the deduction's present value).").

Beginning Option

$

Shares
Week

Total
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Stock

36,393
10,000
Shares
Needed

Shares
Bought

WAC

0 $

30.00

5658

5658

I

30.31

5763

105

30.01

$

Realized
GIL

Deferred
GIL

30.00

2

31.50

6239

476

30.12

3

32.33

6550

311

30.22

4

34.16

7205

655

30.58

5

36.07

7798

593

31.00

6

36.71

7973

175

31.13

7

36.56

7930

(43)

31.13

234

8

35.62

7647

(283)

31.13

1272

9

38.09

8328

681

31.69

10

39.78

8702

374

32.04
32.04

11

36.39

7871

(831)

12

36.92

8025

154

32.14

13

33.59

6868

(1157)

32.14

14

34.21

7101

233

32.20

15

35.93

7715

614

32.50

16

37.60

8225

510

32.82

17

40.38

8881

656

33.38

18

39.50

8712

(169)

33.38

3613
1683

1035

19

41.04

9027

315

33.64

20

40.33

8909

(118)

33.64

789

21

38.74

8567

(342)

33.64

1743

22

37.42

8209

(358)

33.64

1352

23

36.94

8063

(146)

33.64

481

24

36.50

7918

(145)

33.64

414

25

34.81

7242

(676)

33.64

789

26

35.08

7356

114

33.66

10,409
$13,406

$10,409

Under the weighted-average-cost approach, the synthetic option
produces taxable gain of $13,406. Recall that it also produces interest
expense of $10,627. Therefore, the net realized income is $2779.
However, the investor has not sold all the stock holdings, which still
have $10,409 of unrealized appreciation. If we take the synthetic call
to be our normative baseline, then the true call appears to be
undertaxed. All of the gain of the true call is deferred, whereas $2779
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of the gain on the synthetic call is realized currently. 109 The following
table summarizes the findings of this small simulation, comparing the
results of the synthetic call with those of the true call:
Item
Initial Investment
Deferred Gain
Realized Gain
Interest Expense
Net Realized Income
Total Value

Synthetic Call
$36,393
$10,409
$13,406
($10,627)
$2779
$49,581

True Call
$36,393
$13,875
-0-0-0$50,268

This example will hopefully illustrate the potential problem of
option tax under current law - deferral of taxable gain. Nevertheless,
we should be cautious about inferring too much from it too quickly.
First, this example is just one path the stock can take, and it happened
to be a winning path. We have yet to examine what happens with
other paths, on which the stock might decline. Second, even though
this example showed that the synthetic-option would produce income
of $2779, this amount is deferred only for a year. It is not forgiven.
Third, and finally, the $2779 (or 28¢ per share covered by the options)
is only a portion (about 1/5) of the total economic gain on the
synthetic call. By way of comparison, a comprehensive mark-tomarket regime actually performs far worse than does current law in
achieving the synthetic-call ideal. 110
One asset path, over the course of six months, does not yield
enough insights into the gain and loss from trading and the interest
expense or deductions. Although we have a framework for examining
the consequences of deferral, we now need to apply it over many
different scenarios and over a greater period of time. Accomplishing
this task is the goal of the next section.

109

Remember that the option covers 10,000 shares, so a synthetic option covering
one share would have realized gain of about 28¢.
110
Professor Hasen's "quasi-mark-to-market" system would yield short-term
capital gain of $33,100. This is far greater than the $2779 presented in my example or
even the $13,875 that a mark-to-market system would produce.

Virginia Tax Review

172

[Vol. 27:135

V. TAXING THE NAKED OPTION: A MONTE-CARLO SIMULATION

A. Introduction
The goal of this section is to compare the consequences of taxing
options under the synthetic-option ideal described in the prior section
with the consequences of taxing options under the deferral method of
current law. This section will focus on naked options - i.e., options
that are not coupled with a position in the underlying asset. 111 The next
section will focus on covered calls and protective puts - short calls
and long puts combined with the underlying stock. 112 The naked
options are analyzed first because they do not implicate the
constructive sale rules of section 1259.
This section will ask whether current law inappropriately defers
the tax consequences of options. To do so, this section will compare
two types of transactions. The first is the taxation of an actual option
under current law, assuming that the option is settled in cash at the
expiration date. Current law defers the tax consequences of this
transaction until the expiration date (assuming cash settlement). The
second type is a hypothetical synthetic option created by an investor.
The synthetic option is created by delta hedging with daily
rebalancing. Thus, every day will potentially generate gain or loss and
interest expense or income. As with the true option we will assume
that the synthetic-option position is liquidated at the expiration date.
The total gain or loss will be roughly the same between the two
transactions. What is different is the timing. The synthetic option will
produce a series of tax items: interest expense and income and trading
gains and losses. The future value of these tax items will be projected
forward to the exercise date. This future value can then be compared
with the tax consequences on the true option (which exist only at the
111

Cf Campbell Harvey, Futures and Options Glossary, http://www.duke.edu/charvey/Classes/glossary/g_n.htm (last visited May 9, 2007). Professor Harvey's
glossary of finance terms defines naked strategies as:

An unhedged strategy making exclusive use of one of the following: long
call strategy (buying call options), short call strategy (selling or writing call
options), long put strategy (buying put options), and short put strategy
(selling or writing put options). By themselves, these positions are called
naked strategies because they do not involve an offsetting or risk-reducing
position in another option or the underlying security.
!d.
112

See id. at http://www.duke.edu/-charvey/Classes/glossary/g_c.htm, http://www.
duke.edu/-charvey/Classes/glossary/g_p.htm.
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exercise date under current law).
I wrote a computer simulation to compare the taxation of
synthetic options with the current-law taxation of true options. One
might ask why taxation of the synthetic option needs to be measured
by computer simulation. After all, the price of an option can be
derived directly from the Black-Scholes formula, which itself is based
on a synthetic option. Unfortunately, a direct solution to the taxation
of the synthetic option is unavailable because the tax consequences of
a synthetic option depend upon the path the stock takes. The goal of
this article however is to examine the taxation of options held or
written by individual investors on the cash method of accounting.
Unlike dealers, 113 investors will be subject to the realization
requirement, which greatly complicates the analysis. For example, a
decline in delta might prompt our investor to sell stock. The gain or
loss on the sale is determined by the cost of stock previously
purchased, which depends in turn on the history of stock prices. Such
"path dependent" results can be estimated only by a computer
simulation. 114
The calculation will be performed using a so-called Monte-Carlo
simulation that I wrote in the MATLAB computer language. The
computer generated 2000 pseudo-random walks for the stock to take
over the course of five years. Each pseudo-random walk is 1800 steps
long, corresponding with daily price movements measured over five
years. A random number generator determines the daily movement of
stock, using the standard assumption of Brownian motion. 115 The
Dealers would be subject to mark-to-market taxatio~ under I.R.C. § 475.
I.R.C. § 475. See generally David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1549, 1586--87 (1998); Dana L. Trier, Rethinking the Taxation of Nonqualified
Deferred Compensation: Code Sec. 409A, the Hedging Regulations and Code Sec.
1032. , 84 TAXES 141, 168 (2006).
114
See HULL, supra note 8, at 462. Some commentators are uncomfortable with
path dependent tax results. See Herwig J. Schlunk, Little Boxes: Can Optimal
Commodity Tax Methodology Save the Debt-Equity Distinction?, 80 TEx. L. REV. 859,
883-85 (2002).
115
See BRANDIMARTE, supra note 30, at 316. Professor Strnad describes
Brownian motion as follows:
113

Geometric Brownian motion means that the rate of return is a constant
plus a Brownian motion term. A constant rate of return would imply a
smooth, geometrically increasing asset value path. . . . The Brownian
motion term adds a rapidly fluctuating deviation with mean zero to the
constant rate of return. Brownian motion is named after Robert Brown
who observed and described the jerky and random motion of pollen
particles suspended in liquid in 1827-28. Geometric Brownian motion is the
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simulation calculates delta and the components of the synthetic option
on a daily basis. Also, the simulation records the tax items associated
with each day (interest expense or income; gain or loss from trading).
The future value of these tax items is taken for each pseudo-random
walk. As we have 2000 pseudo-random walks, the mean of the results
is reported.
The conclusion of this section is that current law may well be the
best practical system for taxing naked options, although it does
deviate from the synthetic-option ideal. Even though the synthetic
option generates daily gains and losses from trading, they often offset
each other. What current law fails to capture is the interest expense
and income associated with synthetic options. Ultimately, this section
concludes that ignoring this interest component is the best approach
for the tax system.
B. The Hypothetical Stock and Options
This section uses one hypothetical stock on XYZ Corp. We will
assume that XYZ Corp. stock pays no dividends, and that the
standard deviation of its return is 25%. Its current market price is $50
per share. Let us also assume the current risk-free rate of interest is
5% for all periods.
As for the options, let us assume that the exercise price is $50 and
the term of the option is five years long. We now have all of the
information we need to value the options and calculate delta using the
Black-Scholes pricing formula.
Current price: S = $50
Strike price: K = $50
Interest rate: r = 5%
Time to exercise: T = 5
Volatility: = 25%

usual assumption in theoretical finance models of common stock prices.
Recent empirical evidence casts some doubt on the accuracy of the
geometric Brownian motion assumption, but it is hard to come up with an
obvious alternative candidate for theoretical work.
Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 YALE
L.J. 1817, 1870 n.149 (1990) (citations omitted).
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The formulas return the following initial amounts:
Price of call: c = $16.25 116
Price of put: p = $5.19 117
118
Delta of call: ~c= 76.63%
119
Delta of put: ~P= -23.37%.
These results allow us to initiate the synthetic options as follows:

Synthetic Call Option:
•

Buy ~c= 0.7663 shares of XYZ stock for $38.32.

•

Finance this purchase in part with an out-of-pocket
contribution of c = $16.25.

•

The remainder, $22.07, comes from borrowing! 20

Synthetic Put Option:
•

Sell short -~P= 0.2337 of XYZ stock for proceeds of $11.68.

•

Invest these proceeds, plus an additional p
pocket, in a debt instrument.

•

The total investment in the debt instrument is thus
$16.87. 121

= $5.19 out of

We can garner some immediate insights into the expected
taxation of the true options based on the Black-Scholes method. For
technical reasons beyond the scope of this article, cash flows are
116

In MATLAB, blsprice(50, 50, 0.05, 5, 0.25) returns a value of $16.2520 for the

117

In MATLAB, blsprice(50, 50, 0.05, 5, 0.25) returns a value of $5.1920 for the

call.
put.
This is the call delta derived in MATLAB from blsdelta(50, 50, 0.05, 5, 0.25).
This is the put delta derived in MATLAB from blsdelta(50, 50, 0.05, 5, 0.25).
120
A short call would be initiated in inverse fashion. Sell short llc= 0.7663 shares
of XYZ stock for proceeds of $38.32. Place c = $16.25 "in pocket" (representing the
premium received by a call writer). The remainder, $22.07, is invested in a debt
instrument.
121
A short put would be initiated in inverse fashion. Buy -llp= 0.2337 of XYZ
stock for $11.68. Borrow funds to pay for this, plus an additional p = $5.19
(representing the premium received by a put writer) for a total indebtedness of
$16.87.
ns

n

9
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valued at risk-free rates under the Black-Scholes model. 122 As a result,
we can easily arrive at expected values of the option contracts at the
end of five years. The call option is expected to be worth $20.87, 123 and
the put option is expected to be worth $6.67. 124 So, if the options are all
settled in cash, there will be a realization event in five years. At that
time, the taxpayer will have an expected on the call of $4.62 and on
the put of $1.47.
The synthetic option should produce almost the same amount of
total gain or loss. After all, the whole point of a synthetic option is to
replicate the economic gain or loss from a true option. The key issue,
which is being measured by the simulation, is whether the true option
results in more or less tax deferral than a synthetic option. Finding the
"typical" tax treatment of these synthetic options is impractical
without a computer simulation. Even though the final value of the
stock determines the option payoff, it does not determine the interim
tax treatment. We must also know what path the stock took in
reaching its final value. These movements in the stock will determine
interim gains, losses, interest income, and interest expense.
As noted before, I estimated the timing of tax items associated
with synthetic options using a Monte-Carlo simulation written in the
MATLAB programming language. The simulation recalculates delta
and uses the new delta to rebalance the synthetic option on a daily
basis.
The synthetic call option has the following tax items. It will
produce interest expense on a daily basis, but will never produce
interest income. It will also produce gain or loss whenever stock is
required to be sold (i.e., when delta declinesr 25 On days when the
stock is purchased (i.e., when delta rises), no gain or loss is realized.
The synthetic put option has the following tax items. It will
produce interest income on a daily basis, but will never produce
interest expense. It will produce gain or loss whenever short sales are
closed (i.e., when the absolute value of delta declines). 126 On days
122

Readers with a little finance should resist the temptation of determining
expected option payoffs using expected stock values. Because of risk-free pricing, the
expected return on the stock is actually irrelevant. All that matters is the volatility of
the stock. See HULL, supra note 8, at 245.
123
$16.25*e"(0.05*5).
~ $5.19*e"(0.05*5).
125
For a discussion of the weighted-average cost method used to calculate gain or
loss, see supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text.
126
For a discussion of the weighted-average cost method used to calculate gain or
loss, see supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text.
12
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when short sales are initiated (i.e., when the absolute value of delta
rises), no gain or loss is realized.
The simulation will thus generate a series of daily tax items
associated with the synthetic option. We can compare this series to the
gain or loss on the true option by taking the future value of the series.
I did not prepare express simulations for the short call and the short
put. Because the simulations do not allow for any strategic trading, the
results for the short positions should be the exact inverse of the
simulated long positions.
C. Results of Simulation

To recap, the synthetic call option will produce interest expense
plus gain or loss from stock trading, and the synthetic put will produce
interest income plus gain or loss from short selling. This section
reports the results of the simulation of a synthetic call and a synthetic
put. In this simulation, we assume that the initial stock price is $50, the
strike price is $50, the risk-free rate is 5%, the time to exercise is five
years, and the volatility of the stock is 25%. The stock bears no
dividends, and the options are European.
We assume that the stock moves once per day according to the
standard random-walk model. Thus, 1800 steps follow the first day. At
each step, the synthetic option is rebalanced to reflect the change in
stock price. This process is repeated 2000 times. Thus, the computer
simulation rebalances a hedging portfolio 7.2 million times (3.6 million
times for each option). The following tables show how effective delta
hedging is at simulating and bifurcating the true option.
Bifurcation of Call Option Sum (Not Future Value) of Tax Items
Mean Interest Expense on
($6.28)
S_ynthetic Call
$10.54
Mean Net Gain from Stock
Trading on Synthetic Call
Mean Difference between
($0.00)
Synthetic and True Call
Mean Gain on True Call
$4.26
(Sum of Above)
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Bifurcation of Put Option Sum (Not Future Value) of Tax Items
$4.79
Mean Interest Income on
Synthetic Put
($3.37)
Mean Net Loss from Short
Selling_ on Synthetic Put
($0.01)
Mean Difference between
Synthetic and True Put
$1.41
Mean Gain on True Put
(Sum of Above)
These results merely confirm that delta hedging closely replicates
the returns on options and that it is possible to bifurcate the option
gain into more fundamental units - interest and trading gain or loss.
The ultimate goal of the simulation is to examine the timing of
current-law taxation of options under a realization system. To probe
this question, I calculated the future value of the trading items (gains
and losses) and the future value of the interest items (income or
expense). These tax items are measured at the time they accrue by the
MATLAB simulation, and then projected forward to the expiration
date using the assumed discount rate of 5%. The future-value
calculations are listed below:
Analysis of Call Option
Measured Over 2000 Simulations
Tax Items
Mean of
Mean of Sum
Difference
from
Future Value
(Current-Law (Current Law
Less Ideal)
Synthetic Call
(Tax-Policy
Deferral)
Ideal)_
Interest
Expense
($7.08)
($6.27)
$0.81
Net Gain
from Stock
Trading
$10.23
$10.54
$0.31
$3.15
$4.27
$1.12
TOTAL
So, the ideal measure of expected income at the expiration of the
option is about $3.15, but the expected income under current law is
about $4.27. Current law thus appears to overtax the holders of call
options. Most of this over-taxation comes from the failure to grant the
call holder any interest deduction while the call is outstanding. We can
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invert the results to see that current law appears to undertax the
writers of call options, as it does not impute interest income during the
life of the call option.
Analysis of Put Option
Measured Over 2000 Simulations
Tax Items
Difference
Mean of Sum
Mean of
Future Value (Current-Law (Current Law
from
Less Ideal)
Synthetic Put
(Tax-Policy
Deferral)
Ideal)
($0.63)
Interest
$5.42
$4.79
Income
$0.58
Net Loss from ($3.95)
($3.37)
Short Selling
TOTAL
($0.05)
$1.47
$1.42
Current law taxes the put at very close to the right amount. By
committing two theoretical wrongs, current law arrives at practically
the right result for the put. Current law overtaxes the gains and losses
from short trading, but undertaxes the interest income associated with
the put. These two failures appear to cancel each other out. At least
on average, the taxation of the true put and synthetic put are
remarkably close.
D. Interpretation
The results given above are consistent with a more qualitative
explanation of delta hedging. Under this qualitative explanation,
current law is about right in its taxation of put options (both long and
short). In contrast, current law overtaxes long calls and undertaxes
short calls.
Consider, for example, the long call. Current law defers all gain or
loss to some future realization event (e.g., exercise or expiration).
Since the long call is bifurcated into stock ownership and debt, the
synthetic long call produces interest expense over its life. The
synthetic long call will also tend to produce more realized losses than
gains before the end of the option. To see why, recall that the goal
with delta hedging is always to own a number of shares equal to delta.
Now, if stock prices go up, then mathematically delta will also go up. 127
127

The sensitivity of delta to stock prices is given by gamma, which is always
positive. See HULL, supra note 8, at 314.
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The rising delta, in turn, forces the investor to buy more shares. The
rising market produces gains, but they are deferred because the
investor is not selling. In contrast, falling stock prices cause a falling
delta, which forces the synthetic-long-call investor to sell shares. So,
the losses associated with this falling market tend to be realized.
Under this qualitative theory of synthetic long calls, losses tend to
be realized whereas gains tend to be deferred. Moreover, the synthetic
option produces interest deductions throughout its life. In contrast,
current law defers the recognition of all tax items associated with the
option. Because the holder of the call must wait to take advantage of
the losses and expenses produced by the synthetic counterpart,
current law overtaxes the long call. The inverse will hold for the short
call (interest income plus realized gains and deferred losses). Similar
analysis for puts is left to a footnote, 128 and the entire results are
summarized below.
Type of
Synthetic
Option

Trading
Gains

Trading
Losses

Interest

Current Law
Treatment of
True Ogtion

Long Call

Deferred

Realized

Expense

Overtaxes

Short
Call

Realized

Deferred

Income

Undertaxes

Long Put

Deferred

Realized

Income

Short Put

Realized

Deferred

Expense

Correct or
ambiguous
Correct or
ambiguous

This analysis shows that the Monte-Carlo simulation of the prior
Part V.C is consistent with the dynamics of synthetic options. Thus,
we can be sure that current law is not a perfect representation of the
ideal. Yet, as the next section will argue, it may be as close to the ideal
as we can practically achieve.
128

A synthetic long put will produce interest income over its life. When stock
prices rise, delta rises as well. Since delta for a put is negative, the rising delta (e.g.,
from -0.4 to -0.3) means that short sales must be closed. As short sales do poorly in a
rising market, this means that losses are realized. In contrast, a falling market in the
stock means that delta falls as well (e.g., from -0.4 to -0.5). This means that more short
sales need to be executed, triggering no gain or loss. As short sales do well in a falling
market, this means that gains are deferred. In summary, a synthetic long put produces
interest income, defers gains, and triggers losses. A synthetic short put is the opposite
(interest expense, realized gain, and deferred losses).
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E. Policy Implications

Can the tax laws improve the taxation of naked options, using
synthetic options as the policy ideal? The answer is probably not, as
current law achieves results close to the ideal. Synthetic options
produce two types of tax items: (1) gain or loss from trading and (2)
interest income or expense. Option taxation could theoretically be
improved by imputing income or expense based on these items before
the expiration of the option. Doing so would result in great practical
difficulties and only modest improvements.
Imputing the gain or loss from trading is administratively
infeasible, even if theoretically possible. In order to determine the
gain or loss from trading, a taxpayer would have to create a
bookkeeping account to reflect the equity and debt position
associated with the synthetic option. The account would then need to
be updated frequently - probably daily - to reflect the passage of
time and changes in the stock price. Despite its theoretical appeal, this
approach is far too cumbersome and burdensome to use for taxing
real-world options.
Imputing interest may be administratively feasible. Yet, merely
imputing interest would actually worsen the taxation of put options.
Recall that the interest income and trading losses on the synthetic
long put offset each other almost completely in the Monte-Carlo
simulation.129 By failing to recognize either, the results under current
law may do a good job of reflecting the synthetic-option ideal.
Imputing only the interest would destroy this balance.
Imputing interest to calls may improve the performance of option
taxation even without imputing trading gains or losses. Recall that
that the long call produced interest expense and trading losses. 130
Recognizing only the interest expense would mitigate the
shortcomings of current law.
It is not difficult to estimate the expected interest on a call option.
Recall that our synthetic long call is initiated as follows: Buy ·\=
0.7663 shares of XYZ stock for $38.32, and finance this purchase with
an out-of-pocket contribution of $16.25 (which is the option value).
The remainder, $22.07, comes from borrowing.131 We could assume

129

See supra Part V.C.
See id.
131
Put: Sell short -L\= 0.2337 of XYZ stock for proceeds of $11.68. Invest this
amount, plus an additional p = $5.19 in a debt instrument (for a total investment of
$16.87).
130
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that the taxpayer actually does create this initial position when buying
an option, but never changes it over the life of the option. Using the
same 5% rate used to price the options, we see that the hypothetical
interest should come to $6.2i 32 - a result that is almost exactly the
same as reported for the Monte-Carlo simulation reported above. We
should assume that the interest accumulates on a daily basis.
Projecting that daily interest forward to future value yields about
$7.08 - again, very close to the same as for the Monte-Carlo
simulation reported above.
This system is, however, counterintuitive. Even though the buyer
of a call expects to gain from the transaction, the system imputes a
deduction until a realization event occurs. The inverse is true for a call
writer, who pays money for a call yet faces imputed interest income.
Professor Shuldiner's system of imputing interest is more intuitive and
typical, as it imputes interest income, not expense, to the call holder.
Greater consistency with the synthetic-call ideal clashes with tax
aesthetics.
Even if the strangeness of imputing interest according to the
synthetic call does not deter us, some practical considerations may.
Granting an interest deduction to a cash-method call holder may not
even be consistent with the proper taxation of the synthetic call.133 A
synthetic-call holder might face serious difficulties in achieving an
interest deduction before expiration under the cash method. Granting
interest deductions to call holders may also open the door to tax
avoidance 134 unless the deduction is subject to complex systems like
the straddle and wash-sale rules. 135 Moreover, current law may
approximate the overall, correct result by denying call holders any
interest deductions while excusing call writers from any interest
m $22.07*((e"(.05*5))-1).
133

See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
Cf David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive
Tax Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1388-89 (2000) (noting that reforms can
possibly open the door to new tax planning opportunities).
135
For example, suppose that a taxpayer buys and writes the same call option,
creating a perfectly neutral position. The long call produces an interest deduction, and
the short call produces interest income. Suppose that the stock price falls. The fall
pushes delta down, which decreases the amount of debt implicit in either side of the
contract. The taxpayer might like to sell the long call, which is now producing an
interest expense greater than that implied by the current synthetic option.
Contemporaneously, the taxpayer might repurchase another, identical long call. The
wash-sale and straddle rules would independently deny a loss deduction here. But
some similar mechanism would be needed to prevent the taxpayer from refreshing the
imputed interest on only one side of the straddle.
134
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income. If call holders and writers have the same marginal tax rate on
average, then current law reaches the same result as the syntheticoption approach.
Thus, taxing the interest implicit in an option may be both
difficult and of limited ultimate value. More limited reforms may be
feasible. Although section 1258 imposes ordinary-income treatment
on a synthetic bond created by a combination of stock, a long put, and
a short call, section 1258 does not alter the timing of the income from
the synthetic bond. 136 Even though section 1258 treats the synthetic
bond as a bond for characterization, timing of the income is still
determined under the realization standard. This analysis shows why
section 1258 should also impute the interest income on an annual
basis.
F. Conclusion

In Part IV above, I argued that a synthetic option is the
theoretical ideal for taxing equity options. This section attempts to
implement this ideal, focusing on naked options. Because the taxation
of synthetic options depends on the actual path that the stock price
takes, synthetic-option taxation can be measured only with a
computer simulation. According to the simulation, current law
appears to tax put options (long and short) correctly. However,
current law appears to overtax long calls and undertax short calls.
These results are consistent with a qualitative account of the tax items
associated with synthetic options.
Yet, achieving the perfect result for a call option is probably not
feasible. Although synthetic options produce gains and losses from
trading, imputing these tax items to true options is not feasible.
Synthetic options also produce interest income and expense. Imputing
such items to call options is feasible but ultimately unwise. Interest
expense would be imputed to the long call, but allowing a deduction
for this expense may present opportunities for abuse. Imputing
interest income to short calls would not lead to such opportunities.
Imputing interest income to options would destroy the current
136

BITIKER & LOKKEN, supra note 94, <J[ 57.8.3 ("Section 1258 affects only
characterization. Timing is not affected. Interest income is generally recognized as it
accrues, but gains and losses on the positions making up a conversion transaction are
recognized only when realized by a sale, exchange, or termination of those
positions."); DAVID M. SCHIZER, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: SPECIAL RULES <J[ II.A.
(2005) ("Notably, though, this measure [§ 1258] does not accelerate the timing of this
income.").
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symmetry between short and long positions in the same option.
Overall, the system for taxing options may work well, even though
short calls are undertaxed and long calls are overtaxed.
The taxation of short calls and long puts will be examined again in
the next section. There, the options are combined with a position in
the underlying stock. The result - covered calls and protective puts
- would ideally trigger the recognition of unrealized gain in the
underlying stock itself.
VI. TAXING THE COVERED CALL AND PROTECTIVE PUT: A MONTECARLO SIMULATION

A. Covered Calls and Protective Puts
A covered call is a short call combined with ownership of the
underlying asset. Because the writer of the call receives premium
income, prior commentators and courts have struggled with the issue
of whether the writer should be treated as having sold the underlying
asset. Current law answers with a definitive "no." This section will
show that covered calls are best analyzed as implicit short sales. It will
then extend this analysis to protective puts (long puts combined with
ownership of the underlying asset). Under this approach, the taxation
of covered calls and protective puts depends on the delta of the
position, rather than the amount of premium income received.
To illustrate the problem of covered calls, suppose that Maya
owns 10,000 shares of ABC stock. She has a $0 per-share basis in the
stock, which is currently worth $30 per share. Next, suppose that
Maya sells call options on the stock, exercisable in one year at $33 per
share. Maya will receive cash for writing the call, perhaps $36,393
137
($3.6393 per share) if we use the assumptions from above. The
problem arises in determining whether tax law should treat Maya as
having sold the stock when she writes the call on it.
138
Under current law, Maya would pay no tax for writing this call.
The explanation for this treatment is that the short call and the stock
are separate transactions, although the historical basis for this
treatment comes from abstruse reasoning involving the character of

137

See supra text accompanying note 59 (assuming price of $30, strike price of
$33, risk-free rate of 10%, expiration in one year, volatility of 30%, and no dividends).
In MATLAB, blsprice(30, 33, 0.10, 1, 0.30) returns a price of 3.6393 for the call. In
MATLAB, blsdelta(30, 33, 0.10, 1, 0.30) returns a delta of 0.5658 for the call.
138
See BIITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 94, 'II 57.3.1.
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the premium received. 139 Although this result is settled under current
law, the taxation of covered calls has attracted significant attention
from commentators. 140
Option theory bifurcates Maya's short call into a short sale and a
risk-free bond. The number of shares that Maya must sell short in
order to replicate the short call is given by the delta of the call. In our
141
case, the delta is 0.5658. As Maya's short call covers 10,000 shares,
she has essentially made a short sale of 5658 shares. A true short sale
of ABC shares would implicate the constructive sale rules of section
1259 because Maya holds an appreciated position in 10,000 shares of
ABC stock. 142 If a short call was equated with short selling, however,
then Maya would be deemed to have sold 5658 of her owned ABC
shares short at current fair market value when she wrote the call
option.
Note that Maya's gain does not directly depend on the amount of
the premium she received. 143 Maya would have a gain of $169,740, 144
even though she has received a premium of only $36,393. Her gain
would depend on three factors. First, the delta of the option
determines the number of shares that were implicitly sold short.
Second, the fair market value of the stock determines the amount
realized implicitly. Third, the adjusted basis in the stock Maya actually
owns is used to determine the amount of gain.
The delta standard would apply even if the taxpayer pays a
premium. Let us assume that, rather than selling a call, Maya bought a
put over 10,000 shares of ABC stock. If we use the same parameters
139

See id. Bittker and Lokken state:

The earliest expression of this rule is probably found in Virginia Iron Coal
& Coke Co. v. CIR, 99 F2d [sic] 919, 921 (4th Cir. 1938), where the court
noted that when the taxpayer received premiums as writer of a call option it
was impossible to determine whether they were taxable or not. In the event
the sale should be completed the payments became return of capital,
taxable only if a profit should be realized on the sale. Should the option be
surrendered it would then become certain, for the first time, that the
payments constituted payments in the year in which they were made.
/d.
140

See supra Part III.C.4.
See supra note 137.
142
See I.R.C. § 1259.
143
But cf Johnson, supra note 81 (advocating a system for taxing. covered calls
based on the premium received).
144
Maya has sold 5658 shares for $30. Her gain is the entire amount realized as
her adjusted basis is zero.
141
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as before, the put would cost her $34,989. 145 The delta for the put is
-0.4342. Thus, buying this put option is the same as implicitly selling
4342 shares of ABC stock short. Current law does not tax Maya upon
buying the put, even if she already owns ABC stock. Yet, the delta
standard of this section would treat Maya as executing a short sale
over 4342 shares, producing gain of $130,260.
Thus, option theory gives tax policy a way of dealing with the
ancient problem of covered calls and the related problem of
protective puts. In order to ensure consistency between the taxation of
short sales and the taxation of options, these options should be treated
146
as constructive sales (based on the Black-Scholes delta calculation).
The example given above shows only the initial consequences of the
covered call and protective put under the delta model. It does not
follow through to the end of the options. Exploring the tax
consequences over the entire life of the options is the goal of the next
two sections.
B. Fluctuating Deltas and Constructive Sales
A possible critique of the delta standard described in Part III
above is that delta itself fluctuates over the life of an option. 147 If delta
changes immediately after the covered call or protective put is
executed, then is it possible to apply the delta model at all? As this
section will show, fluctuating deltas are not an intractable problem.
Instead, this section will show that delta acts like a ratchet on
constructive sales because, like real sales, constructive sales cannot
ordinarily be undone. So, fluctuations in delta can only increase
overall constructive sales.
Let us return to an example from the prior Part VI.A. Maya
writes a covered call over 10,000 shares of ABC stock in which she has
a zero basis. The current price of ABC is $30 per share, and the strike
price of the call is $33 per share. Applying the other assumptions
given above, we come to a Black-Scholes price on the option of
148
$36,393 (or $3.6393 per share). Under current law, the writer of a
"covered call" has not triggered realization of the owned assets.
145

In MATLAB, blsprice(30, 33, 0.10, 1, 0.30) returns a put price of 3.4989, and
blsdelta(30, 33, 0.10, 1, 0.30) returns a put delta of -0.4342.
146
This approach is at odds with "the popular conception that 'paper gains' do
not constitute income." Deborah Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule,
57 TAX L. REV. 355, 355-56 (2004).
147
See Schizer, supra note 42, at 1364-67.
148
See supra note 137.
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Under the delta model described in Part II, however, Maya would be
treated as having executed a short sale over 5658 shares of ABC stock,
triggering gain under the constructive sale rules.
Let us also return to the possible walk that the stock took from
$30 to $35.08 as suggested above. 149 There, we examined how the
position of a call holder could be closely replicated using stock trading
and borrowing. The position of a call writer is replicated in very
similar, yet inverse, fashion. Here, we use short selling and investing in
a risk-free asset. The replication is detailed in the following table.
Note that positive numbers under "Shares Shorted" represent the
execution of short sales; negative numbers represent closing of short
sales.

149

See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
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Option
Beginning Value
Shares

Week
0 $
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Stock
30.00
30.31
31.50
32.33
34.16
36.07
36.71
36.56
35.62
38.09
39.78
36.39
36.92
33.59
34.21
35.93
37.60
40.38
39.50
41.04
40.33
38.74
37.42
36.94
36.50
34.81
35.08

$

36,393
10,000

Shares
Delta Shorted
0.5658
5658
0.5763
105
0.6239
476
0.6550
311
0.7205
655
0.7798
593
0.7973
175
0.7930
(43)
(283)
0.7647
0.8328
681
0.8702
374
(831)
0.7871
0.8025
154
(1157)
0.6868
0.7101
233
0.7715
614
0.8225
510
0.8881
656
(169)
0.8712
0.9027
315
(118)
0.8909
(342)
0.8567
(358)
0.8209
(146)
0.8063
(145)
0.7918
(676)
0.7242
0.7356
114

Total

Ending

True
Option
Synthetic
Option

(Vol. 27:135

Invested
Proceeds
from Short
Selling
$133,347
3183
14,994
10,055
22,375
21,390
6424
(1572)
(10,080)
25,939
14,878
(30,240)
5686
(38,864)
7971
22,061
19,176
26,489
(6676)
12,928
(4759)
(13,249)
(13,396)
(5393)
(5293)
(23,532)
3999
$197,840

Interest
$0
256
263
292
312
356
398
411
409
390
441
470
413
425
351
367
410
447
499
487
513
505
481
456
446
437
392
$10,627

Risk-Free
Asset
$133,347
136,786
152,043
162,390
185,077
206,823
213,645
212,483
202,811
229,141
244,459
214,689
220,788
182,349
190,670
213,098
232,684
259,621
253,444
266,859
262,614
249,870
236,954
232,016
227,170
204,075
208,467

$ (50,268)
$ (49,581)

Initially, the synthetic short call is created by a short sale over
5658 shares, yielding total proceeds of $169,740. Maya can do what
she pleases with $36,393 of these proceeds, which represent the
premium received for the option. The remainder ($133,347) is
invested in a risk-free asset. Every week, short sales and risk-free
assets are rebalanced to reflect changes in delta. At the end of week
twenty-six, the synthetic short call is represented by an outstanding
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short position over 7356 shares. Because the stock is now at $35.08, it
would cost $258,048 to close this position. The risk-free asset is worth
$208,467, and the overall position is a liability of $49,581, which is
close to the true Black-Scholes value of $50,268.
Now, however, we must determine how to model constructive
sales. The fluctuations in delta obviously trigger fluctuations in the
amount of outstanding short selling. This section of the article will
model these fluctuations as if short sales had a ratchet effect on
constructive sales. So, when a taxpayer closes a short sale, it does not
reverse any constructive sales that were triggered by it. There is a
technical difficulty with this assumption - the closed-transaction
exception to the constructive sale rules. Under this exception, a short
sale does not trigger a constructive sale if (1) the short sale is closed
within thirty days of the end of the taxable year in which it was made,
(2) the taxpayer continues to hold the owned stock for at least sixty
days after the short sale is closed, and (3) during those sixty days the
taxpayer's risk of loss over the owned stock is not diminished by using
a call, put, forward, or similar contract. 150 Arguably, the taxpayer fails
(3) while continuing to engage in the delta-hedging strategy, as some
short sales always remain outstanding. If not, then we have a
complicated problem.' 5 '
Another complicated problem is the fact that the same shares
152
could be constructively sold more than one time under section 1259.
In the interest of simplicity, I have assumed that constructive sales are
triggered when (but only when) the total short position exceeds its
prior maximum. This interpretation is consistent with the purpose of
section 1259 and with the broader principle that completed sales of
property cannot be reversed in order to avoid taxable gain. So, we can
avoid the closed-transaction exception and the possibility of multiple
constructive sales of the same shares.

150

I.R.C. §§ 1259(c)(3)(A), 246(c)(4).
The constructive sales for any taxable year would be based on the lesser of (1)
the highest outstanding short sale for the taxable year or (2) the highest outstanding
short sale for the period running from thirty to ninety days after the close of the
taxable year. If prong (2) applied, we would have the additional problem of matching
the short sales with actual stock prices.
152
Suppose that delta and the stock follow a path of (1) $30, -40%; (2) $30,-50%,
(3) $30, -40%, (4) $40, -50%. On day two, we have a constructive sale of 0.10 shares at
$30 because delta declined by 10 basis points. Technically, we should have a new
constructive sale on day four as well, because delta has again declined by ten basis
points. Ignoring this constructive sale greatly simplifies the mechanics of the model.
I.R.C. § 1259( c)(1 ).
151
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Now that our assumptions are clarified, let us return to the
example. The initial short sale potentially leads to a constructive sale
over 5658 shares. Assuming a zero basis in ABC stock, the call would
initially trigger gain of $169,740. At the end of the twenty-six week
position, the short position is even greater, standing at 7356 shares,
and the maximum short position over the twenty-six week position
was 9027 at week nineteen. Under the ratchet theory, any increase in
total short sales over the past all-time high would lead to a new
constructive sale. Applying this ratchet model to the prior example
leads to the following schedule of constructive sales and related gain
(assuming a zero basis for ABC stock).

Week
0 $
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Totals

Stock
30.00
30.31
31.50
32.33
34.16
36.07
36.71
36.56
35.62
38.09
39.78
36.39
36.92
33.59
34.21
35.93
37.60
40.38
39.50
41.04
40.33
38.74
37.42
36.94
36.50
34.81
35.08

Delta Constructive Sales
0.5658
5658
0.5763
105
476
0.6239
0.6550
311
0.7205
655
0.7798
593
0.7973
175
0.7930
0.7647
0.8328
355
0.8702
374
0.7871
0.8025
0.6868
0.7101
0.7715
0.8225
0.8881
179
0.8712
146
0.9027
0.8909
0.8567
0.8209
0.8063
0.7918
0.7242
0.7356
9027

Gain Realized
169,740
3183
14,994
10,055
22,375
21 ,390
6424
-

13,522
14,878

-

-

7228

5992

289,779

As in the prior section, the simple example using ABC stock can
demonstrate how the components of the synthetic option should be
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taxed. 153 Yet, as before, the ABC-stock example shows just one path
that stock may take. Moreover, the twenty-six week period is not long
enough to explore the full consequences from the deferral regime of
current law. Measuring the likely value of this deferral requires a
longer option measured over more numerous paths.
In summary, this section showed how the delta model could deal
with fluctuations in delta, which in turn cause fluctuations in the
implied short-sale position. Fluctuating delta creates some complexity,
which can be overcome with simplifying assumptions. The approach I
took treats the short sales as a ratchet that is being applied to
constructive sales. Constructive sales occur only when the short-sale
position reaches new highs. Measuring the consequences of these
constructive sales is the goal of the next section.
C. A Monte-Carlo Simulation of Constructive Sales

Let us briefly review the problem of the prior two sections. An
investor who owns appreciated stock might either write a call (a
covered call) or buy a put (a protective put). Under current law, the
investor has almost certainly not realized any gain on the owned stock
from either the covered call or the protective put. I have argued,
however, that the policy ideal is to tax options according to their
constituent transactions. In the context of covered calls and protective
puts, we would bifurcate the option into a combination of a short sale
and investment in a risk-free asset. The short sale is what is interesting
here, because it would cause the investor to realize gain under the
constructive sale rules of section 1259. 154 The delta of the option,
which fluctuates over time and with movements in the stock,
determines the amount of short sales outstanding at any given time.
Thus, the short-sale position fluctuates along with delta. In order to
simplify the model, I assume that delta acts like a ratchet on short
sales, which therefore trigger constructive sales only when the total
amount of short sales exceeds the previous all-time high. The prior
section ended with an example that illustrates the workings of this
•
155
assumptiOn.
If the investor ultimately sells the stock at the end of the option,
then the total gain or loss realized is no different if we measure under
current law or under the delta model. 156 What is different is the timing
1 3

~

See supra Part V.

154

I.R.C. § 1259(c).

155

See supra Part VI. B.
If the investor died owning the stock, then the basis step up of section 1014

156
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of the gain or loss. Because constructive sales generate gain (but not
losses), the policy ideal given by the delta model will tend to
accelerate the realization of gain when compared to current law. The
goal of this section is to measure the value of the deferral given by
current law and also to examine some practical ways to curtail it
according to the delta model.
Let us then return to the long-term example using XYZ stock,
which was the basis for the Monte-Carlo simulation of Part V. Allow
me to restate the relevant particulars of the XYZ stock, the options on
the stock, and the nature of the Monte-Carlo simulation.
Initial Price:
Exercise Price:
Risk-Free Rate:
Time to Exercise:
Volatility:
Dividends:
Number of Simulated Paths:
Black-Scholes Call Price:
Black-Scholes Put Price:
Black-Scholes Call Delta:
Black-Scholes Put Delta:

$50
$50
5%
5 years
25%
None
2000
$16.2520
$5.1920
76.63%
-23.37%

Let us assume that an investor owns 10,000 shares of XYZ stock with
a zero basis. Next, let us examine separately the proper tax treatment
of a covered call and protective put, each over 10,000 shares of stock.
Under current law, the investor has no tax consequences from
either buying the put or from selling the call. (If the investor did both,
however, he would probably trigger the constructive sale rules. 157)
Current law defers the tax consequences with respect to the shares of
XYZ stock that the taxpayer owns. The focus of this section is on
when the gain from the sale of XYZ stock should be recognized.
Under the simulation, the mean price of the stock is $63.9143 after
five years. 158 Let us assume that the investor plans to sell the stock in
would effectively eliminate any gain or loss that accumulated before the investor's
death. I.R.C. § 1014(a).
157
Since the transaction is not described in the statute, it might not actually be a
constructive sale as the IRS has not yet issued regulations under section 1259 (despite
the nine-year-old mandate to do so). Cf Phillip Gall, Phantom Tax Regulations: The
Curse of Spurned Delegations, 56 TAX LAW. 413 (2003).
158
Because of the risk-free nature of Black-Scholes pricing, the model assumes
that stock grows at the risk-free rate. Thus, we should expect the stock to be worth
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five years, giving him an expected future payoff of $639,143.
The synthetic short call would be initiated by the short sale of
7663 shares, and the synthetic long put would be initiated by the short
sale of 2337 shares. Initially, $38,315 of gain is triggered by selling the
call, and $11,685 of gain is triggered by buying the put. Afterwards,
future short sales would be executed or closed to track changes in
delta, with constructive sales being triggered according to the ratchet
theory (i.e., whenever total short sales exceeds the previous all-time
high).
Since we are assuming the investor would sell the stock in five
years, the constructive sales do not increase the sum of the gain
realized. 159 The constructive sales do, however, affect the timing of
gain recognition. In order to measure the benefit of deferring gain, the
simulation measures the constructive sale each day. This series of sales
can then be projected to future value. 160 Those results are the basis for
the following table, which further breaks the future value number
down between the sum of the gain (i.e., what is taxed under current
law), the time-value of money on the initial constructive sale, and the
time-value of money on interim constructive sales.
Means Measured Over 2000 Observations
Sum of Gain on Owned Stock
(Current Law)
TVM of Initial Constructive
Sale
TVM of Interim Constructive
Sales
Future Value of Gains
(Policy Ideal)

Short Call
639,143

Long Put
639,143

108,816

33,185

19,569

28,014

767,528

700,342

The first row of numbers (Sum of Gain) represents what current
law taxes. Recall that we are concerned about the taxation of the
XYZ stock itself. The gain realized on the stock is not affected by
whether the investor enters into an option contract; so we see the

SO*e"(S%*5)=64.2013 after five years. The result given by the simulation, 63.9143, is
a close approximation.
159
The investor can adjust his basis in the stock in order to reflect constructive
sales. See I.R.C. § 1259(a)(2)(A).
160
Also, the entire holdings of stock are liquidated at the end of the five years.
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same number in both columns. The second row is the time value of
money attributable to the initial short sale implicit in the option.
Under the assumptions of this section, a constructive sale is triggered
immediately when the investor enters into the option. This initial
constructive sale is given by the delta of the option. The second row
describes the benefit taxpayers receive from deferring this initial gain.
The third row represents the time value of money attributable to
subsequent constructive sales generated under the ratchet theory
developed in Part VI.B.
Another way of viewing the numbers is that the first row is what
the law actually accomplishes, the second row is what the law could
conceivably accomplish, and the third row is what the law probably
cannot reach. Imputing a constructive sale on the execution of the
option may be practical. But it might not be practical to impute
constructive sales based on interim fluctuations in delta. Doing so
would require frequent (perhaps daily) tracking of stock prices and
recalculation of the short sales implied by the options. Moreover,
much of the prior section dealt with the practical difficulties of
modeling the constructive sales produced by interim fluctuations in
delta. Nonetheless, it might be practical to impute a constructive sale
based upon the initial delta of an option. Indeed, most of the time
value of money that is lost under current law can be attributable to the
initial constructive sale. After all, the initial constructive sale is the
largest in size and the earliest in time.
In summary, this section used the same set of stock prices used in
Part V.B, the set containing 2000 separate random walks, each of
which is 1800 days long. This section then reported the results of a
Monte-Carlo simulation of the constructive sales that would be
triggered by a covered call and a protective put. The simulation shows
that current law results in a significant amount of deferral when
compared to the policy ideal of the delta model. Fully implementing
the delta model may be impractical, however, as doing so would
involve frequent recalculation of delta. That being said, a very large
amount of the unwarranted deferral can be eliminated simply by
determining using the initial delta of the option and ignoring interim
fluctuations. The next section attempts to extend this approach to
certain combinations of covered calls and protective puts known as
equity collars and variable prepaid forward contracts.
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D. Applying the Delta Model to Equity Collars and Variable Prepaid
Forwards
Under the delta model developed by this section, a covered call or
a protective put triggers a constructive sale of a portion of the stock
owned by an investor. The amount of the constructive sale is given by
the delta of the option, calculated at the time the option is executed.
Later increases in delta would ideally trigger more constructive sales,
but measuring those later constructive sales is impractical. This
section extends this delta model to two close substitutes for short
sales: an equity collar and a variable prepaid forward contract.
As noted in Part III.B, an equity collar combines a short call with
a long put. Typically the investor also owns appreciated shares of the
stock covered by the option and wishes to hedge against future
movements in the stock, but without incurring the tax liability that
comes with selling the stock. Even though the exercise price on the
short call will be higher than on the long put, the position is
economically very similar to a short sale. In fact, the goal of a tax
planners is to have the collar replicate a short sale as closely as
possible while safely avoiding the constructive sale rules.
Dean Schizer mentioned a delta model for equity collars
previously, but ultimately dismissed it on political and technical
grounds. 161 The political argument is that taxpayers and their advisors
would effectively oppose a delta model. 162 Perhaps so, but perhaps tax
shelters like equity collars and variable prepaid collars will become an
appealing target for a Congress that wants to expand spending or cut
overall tax rates. Dean Schizer's technical critique is that calculating
163
the delta of an equity collar is impracticable or impossible. Recall,
however, that an equity collar is simply a short call and a long put
combined. The delta for such a combination is simply the sum of the
delta of the two pieces. 164

161

Dean Schizer is also concerned that subjecting equity collars to a wider
application of the constructive sale rules would lead to "lock in" and push taxpayers
into less effective hedges. See Schizer, supra note 42, at 1365. The lock-in rationale is
usually invoked to support a capital-gains preference and is controversial among
commentators. See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 94, 'll 3.5.7. This critique
has lost any vitality that it may have once had after the capital gains rate was cut to
15% in 2001.
162
Schizer, supra note 42, at 1366.
163
ld. at 1365--Q6.
164
Readers with calculus will easily see why. Delta is the first partial derivative of
the instrument price taken with respect to the stock price. So, if an equity collar is the
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Consider an example from Dean Schizer's article. Suppose that a
share of stock is currently worth $100. The spread on the collar is from
$95 to $115. 165 Suppose that the volatility is 40%, the risk-free rate is
5%, and the time to expiration is three years. 166 The collar has a value
of $10.97. The put (with exercise price of $95) costs the investor
$16.50. The call (with exercise price of $115) brings the investor
$27.47. Thus, the investor would receive the difference ($10.97) under
the Black-Scholes formula. The delta of the collar is -90%, composed
of the put delta (-26%) minus the call delta (64%). Even though this
transaction does not trigger the constructive sale rules, it is very close
in effect to a conventional short sale. A pure short sale would have
delta of -100%, compared with the -90% delta for the collar.
But what if we do not know what the volatility of the stock
actually is? We do know the output of a function (the instrument
price) and all inputs but one. Unfortunately, the Black-Scholes
equation cannot be inverted to derive an analytic solution for the
unknown input. 167 However, the solution in any particular case can be
found using numerical methods. 168
Suppose that we have a collar on a stock that lasts for three years.
The stock is currently worth $100, and the collar spread is from $90 to
$110. The risk-free rate is 5%. The investor receives $11 for the collar.
If we thought that the $11 received was the true Black-Scholes value,
then the parameters just given would imply a volatility of about 15%
on the stock and a delta of the collar of about -77%. 169 Yet, the $11
sum of a long put and short call, then the delta for the equity collar is the sum of the
delta of the long put and the short call.
16~
See Schizer, supra note 42, at 1345-46.
166
See id. at 1350 n.129.
167
See HULL, supra note 8, at 250.
168
The sought after volatility is on the stock. Theoretically, one could observe
the prices of other options to derive the volatility of the stock. One problem is that
most options in the United States are sold over-the-counter. Publicly traded options
are of relatively short term, typically under two years. If publicly traded options were
three to five years long, investors could combine them to create equity collars without
the need to involve the investment bankers. The volatility observed on a short-term
option may not carry over to a long-term option. This is because of the "volatility
smile" - the phenomenon that implied volatility depends on the strike price and time
to exercise of an instrument. I d. at 330, 334-37.
169
Recall that this collar is created by buying a put with a strike price of $90 and
writing a call with a strike price of $110. The Black-Scholes price for the put is given
in MATLAB by blsprice(lOO, 90, 0.05, 3, 0.1505), which returns $1.98. The price for
the collar is given by blsprice(100, 110, 0.05, 3, 0.1505), which returns $12.98. As we
can see, the volatility of 15.05% is consistent with the $11 received for entering this
collar. We can use this volatility to find the delta of the collar, which is the delta of the
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may be less than the true Black-Scholes value. Dean Schizer reports
that the typical fee on an equity collar is 1% of the hedged asset's
value for every year the collar is open. In our example, this is $3. So,
in the present example, the charge would be $3 (1% times $100 times
three years). If we were sure that the investment bank was charging a
170
commission of $3, then we could calculate implied volatility by
assuming the investor received $14. This implies volatility of about
32% and a delta of about -88%. A delta model for taxing equity
collars might, for ease of administration, ignore the banker's fee when
calculating the delta on the collar. In the example just given, assuming
that the price received is the true Black-Scholes price leads to a lower
delta and thus a lower constructive sale. Using this simplification, we
would assume a constructive sale with respect to 77% of the shares
covered by the collar, rather than 88%.
The approach just described can be extended to variable prepaid
forward contracts (VPFC). VPFCs are structured as forward contracts
but are, in essence, modified equity collars. Recall that an investor
executes an equity collar with a protective put having a low strike
price and a covered call having a higher strike price. The key
modification with the VPFC is that the call covers fewer shares than
the put. 171 The fraction covered by the call is usually the high strike
price divided by the price of the stock at the time the VPFC is
executed. For example, suppose that we have a VPFC on a stock that
lasts for three years. The stock is currently worth $100, and the
implied collar spread is from $100 to $125. If the put portion of the
VPFC covers 10,000 shares, then the call portion would cover only
8000 shares. 172 We might also think of the VPFC payoff as combining a
traditional equity collar over 8000 shares plus an additional protective
put over 2000 shares. The following graph will hopefully illuminate
the difference between an equity collar and a VPFC.
put minus the delta of the call. Recall that we subtract the call delta because the
investor is writing, not buying, the call. The delta of the put is given by blsdelta(100,
90, 0.05, 3, 0.1505), which returns -0.1335. The delta of the call is given by
blsdelta(lOO, 110, 0.05, 3, 0.1505), which returns 0.6331. Thus, the delta for the collar
is -0.7666.
170
1% of $100 for each of the three years.
171
The variable prepaid forward contracts (VPFC) has the same cash flows as the
modified equity collar combined with a loan equal to the value of the shares at the
time the VPFC is executed. See generally David F. Levy, Towards Equal Tax
Treatment of Economically Equivalent Financial Instruments: Proposals for Taxing
Prepaid Forward Contracts, Equity Swaps, and Certain Contingent Debt Instruments, 3
FLA. TAX REV. 471 (1997).
112
10,000 * 100/125.
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Equity Collar versus VPFC
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The VPFC can be taxed according to the delta model if we can
extract an implied volatility. Once we have an implied volatility for
the stock, calculating delta for the VPFC is trivially easy.
Unfortunately, doing this is trickier than it was with the equity collar
for two reasons. First, ignoring the banker's fee may now harm, rather
than help, the taxpayer. Second, even if we can factor the banker's fee
into the valuation, the VPFC might actually imply two separate
volatilities, which would lead to two separate deltas.
Return to the prior example and suppose the risk-free rate is 5%
and the taxpayer receives a net amount of $0 for entering the VPFC.
We might be ready to find an implied volatility of 54.29% and a delta
of -78.65%, as they correspond with a Black-Scholes value of zero.
But, we need to recall that the value observed will lower than the true
Black-Scholes value because of the investment bank's fee. We could
disregard this with the collar, because using the lower observed value
simply lowered the implied volatility and the magnitude of delta,
working to the benefit of the taxpayer. Our situation is more
ambiguous with the VPFC. Assume that the true value of the position
is really $1.50, which the investment bank keeps as its fees. This value
actually implies two volatilities (10.20% and 24.57%) and two deltas
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(-47.20% and -69.90% ). In this example, we might feel safe choosing
the 24.57% volatility, as it is more typical for stocks. But, the choice
may not always be so clear.
The failure to achieve perfection should not, however, be an
argument against the delta model. Even if the taxpayer chiseled the
government in the above example and claimed a 10.20% implied
volatility (and a -47.20% delta), he is still being subjected to a
constructive sale of 47.20% of his holdings of the stock. This is clearly
an improvement over the complete deferral allowed by current law.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article set out to analyze the proper taxation of options to
buy or sell stock. In the Introduction, I described a call option that
Maya buys that entitles her to buy 10,000 shares of XMPL stock for
$100 in five years. Current law imposes no tax consequences on Maya
until she exercises the option, it lapses, or she sells it. This approach is
probably the best. We can bifurcate Maya's option into a synthetic
option, initially composed of 7500 shares of XMPL and $400,000 of
borrowing. Theoretically, Maya should be taxed as based on the
synthetic option. However, the Monte-Carlo simulation above
demonstrates that doing so is not materially different from the results
produced by current law. Thus, current law passes a very strong test
when we examine the option in isolation (i.e., naked options).
We have a very different result if Maya sold the option and
already owns 10,000 appreciated shares in XMPL. Here, the synthetic
option is represented by the sale, or short sale, of 7500 shares of
XMPL. If Maya sells 7500 shares of stock she already owns- or if she
sells 7500 shares short - then she must pay tax on the gain. Thus, she
should face a constructive sale on 7500 shares when she sells a call. A
similar result applies if Maya buys a protective put or enters into a
more complex contract that combines covered calls and protective
puts. The two contracts discussed in this article were equity collars
and variable prepaid contracts, both of which should trigger
immediate taxable gain as well.
Thus, the primary shortcoming of current law is that the
constructive sale rules of section 1259 do not apply to covered calls,
protective puts, and related contracts. Otherwise, option taxation
seems to work fine.
On a broader level, I hope that the approach of this article will
reinvigorate the use of bifurcation techniques by scholars and
policymakers. Financial theory supplies a rich, if arcane, set of tools
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that potentially allows us to break down financial contracts into
fundamental units like stock and borrowing. Taxing financial contracts
strictly according to their fundamental units may be impracticable.
But, the approach gives us a normative baseline to use when selecting
from the set of administratively and politically feasible methods of
taxation.

Naked and Covered in Monte Carlo

2007]
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APPENDIX A: STEPS IN DELTA HEDGING
1. Determine the initial value of the option using the BlackScholes formula.
a. For a call, this value is "c".
b. For a put, this value is "p".
2. Determine the initial delta
related to Black-Scholes.

(~)

of the option using a formula

3. Note the current price of the stock (S).
4. Create a synthetic option or replicating portfolio in the
following manner. (Note that in each case the initial cash flow
for the synthetic option is the same as for a true option.)
a. Long call: Purchase ~ shares of stock. This costs ~*S.
This is financed by an out-of-pocket contribution equal
to c. The remainder, ~*S-c, is obtained by borrowing.
b. Short call: Sell short ~ shares of stock. This produces
proceeds of ~*S. Of this, place the premium, c, in the
investor's pocket. (This represents the premium
payment that a call writer receives.) The remainder,
~*S-c, is used to purchase a debt instrument.
c.

Long put: Sell short negative ~ shares of stock. (Note
that delta for a put is already negative.) Use these
proceeds, plus an out-of-pocket contribution equal to
p, to buy a debt instrument. (Recall that a put writer
must pay a premium to buy a put.)

d. Short put: Purchase negative ~ shares of stock. Borrow
~*S to do this. Borrow an additional amount, p, to
place in the investor's pocket. This amount represents
the premium received.
5. Every day (or week or hour or other period) rebalance the
synthetic option. Passage of time and movements in the stock
price cause changes in delta. The synthetic option is
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rebalanced when the position in the stock is adjusted to
reflect the new delta.
a. Long call: Always make sure that the number of shares
owned equals delta. If delta rises, buy more stock using
more borrowing. If delta falls, sell stock and use the
proceeds to pay of the existing borrowing.
b. Short call: Always make sure that the number of shares
shorted equals delta. If delta rises, sell more stock
short and use the proceeds to increase the investment
in the debt instrument. If delta falls, close short sales;
as the investor must buy shares to close the short sales,
he will obtain the needed funds by liquidating a
portion of the debt instrument.
c.

Long put: Always make sure that the number of shares
shorted equals negative delta. If delta rises (e.g., from
-50% to -40% ), close short sales, obtaining funds from
the debt instrument. If delta falls (e.g., from -50% to
-60% ), engage in more short selling, investing the new
proceeds in the debt instrument.

d. Short put: Always make sure that the number of shares
owned equals negative delta. If delta rises (e.g., from
-50% to -40% ), sell stock, using the proceeds to pay off
borrowing. If delta falls (e.g., from -50% to -60% ), buy
more stock, borrowing more funds to pay for the
purchase.

